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INTIMACY AND ECONOMIC EXCHANGE
Jill Elaine Hasday*
The current legal debate about the regulation of economic exchange between intimates
mistakenly assumes that the law does not countenance such exchange to any notable
extent. This assumption is so widely held that it unites otherwise disparate
anticommodification and pro-market scholars. Both groups agree that the law maintains
a strict boundary between economic exchange and intimacy, and disagree only on
whether to applaud or criticize that boundary. Both overlook or underemphasize the
degree to which the law already permits economic exchange within intimate
relationships.
The current debate's focus on whether the law should enforce economic exchanges
between intimates misses at least three critical questions: how the law already regulates
such exchanges, for what purposes, and with what consequences. One of the primary
ways that the law constitutes an intimate relation as intimate - recognizes its dignity
and distinguishes it from other relationships - is by regulating how economic resources
are exchanged within the relationship. But efforts to denote the sanctity of intimate
relationships through the regulation of economic exchange appear to systematically
perpetuate and exacerbate distributive inequality for women and the poor. These
distributive consequences suggest a need to reexamine and reform how the legal system
establishes the specialness of an intimate relationship. This Article begins that project.
INTRODUCTION
Legal scholars are currently engaged in an intense, but misdirected,
debate about whether the law should sanction economic exchange
within intimate relationships, such as relationships between spouses,
unmarried sexual partners, or parents and their children. This debate
operates on the mistaken premise that the law does not countenance
economic exchange between intimates to any notable extent.
Indeed, that premise shapes the two main camps in the existing
discussion about how the law governing intimate relationships should
regulate economic exchange, the exchange of money or economic as-
sets. One side of the debate applauds the law's decision to keep eco-
nomic exchange out of intimacy. This anticommodification position
argues that legalized "commodification" - legally sanctioned and
regulated economic exchange - has no place in intimate relationships,
and advocates maintaining the legal separation between economic ex-
change and intimacy. The other side of the debate criticizes the law's
* Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. B.A. 1994, J.D. 1997, Yale Uni-
versity. I would like to thank Ariela Dubler, Allan Erbsen, Martha Ertman, Mary Louise Fel-
lows, Richard Primus, Reva Siegel, Viviana Zelizer, and the participants in a faculty workshop at
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decision to keep economic exchange out of intimacy. This pro-market
position argues for the legalized commodification of intimate relation-
ships, contending that economic exchange in intimate relationships can
be a source of freedom and equality for intimates.
Both the anticommodification and pro-market positions are
grounded on a fundamental misconception about the actual state of
the law. Both positions overlook or underemphasize the degree to
which the law already permits economic exchange within intimate re-
lationships. The relevant legal question is not, and has never been,
whether intimates will exchange economic assets; it is when they will
do so, how, why, in what forms, and to what ends. Economic ex-
change is not foreign to intimate relations, either as a matter of first
principles or as a positive matter of legal regulation. One of the pri-
mary ways that the law constitutes intimate relations as intimate is by
regulating how economic resources are exchanged within them.
This does not mean that intimate relationships can simply be re-
duced to a series of legalized economic exchanges, as the old feminist
claim that marriage is legalized prostitution or more recent law and
economics work might have it. The legal connection between intimate
relationships and economic exchange is more subtle and complex than
such a flattening notion can suggest. The law's regulation of economic
exchange between intimates, which restricts but does not bar economic
transfers, helps to define and construct the legal understanding of in-
timacy, and to mark the dignity and specialness of intimate relations.
Phrased another way, the legal regulation of economic exchange be-
tween intimates produces intimacy and not just commodification.
This Article explores the legal regulation of economic exchange in
marriage, nonmarital sexual relationships, and parent-child relation-
ships. In doing so, it emphasizes the distinction between legal and so-
cial exchange. Economic assets circulate widely between intimates as
a matter of social practice and customary understandings, but that
does not mean that legal title, legal claim, or legal rights to those assets
circulate as well. It is worth remembering that the field of social prac-
tice is different from the domain of legally enforceable rights, even if
the legal system frequently follows social practice and helps construct
social practice.
The social practices shaping the exchange of economic assets be-
tween intimates are one way in which intimacy is created. Within
these social practices, economic exchange between intimates frequently
takes the form of what we might call structured altruism. Economic
exchange between intimates is not wholly spontaneous and involves
bargaining as well as altruism. But economic exchange between inti-
mates is spontaneous compared to other economic exchanges, marking
a relationship differently.
The legal system also attempts to mark intimate relations as differ-
ent, in part by claiming that they are separate from the market. The
20051
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law ostentatiously refuses to enforce certain kinds of economic ex-
change between intimates, while then diverting or channeling that ex-
change into other vehicles for securing material needs. Indeed, the le-
gal system regularly acts on the unexamined conviction that the
prohibition on certain kinds of exchange relations between intimates is
an important mechanism through which the law preserves the distinct-
iveness and specialness of intimate relationships.
In fact, the law preserves something of enormous social value by
insisting in its regulation of economic exchange between intimates on
distinctions - between marriage and prostitution, for example, or be-
tween adopting a child and purchasing one - rather than accepting
conflation. Differentiation is an important function of the law and can
be valid and legitimate. At the same time, legal methods of differen-
tiation that are suitable under some social conditions and circum-
stances may be unsuitable under others. In particular, the law's pur-
suit of expressive interests through the regulation of economic
exchange between intimates is appropriately reconsidered and re-
formed when it sustains persistent status inequality or distributive
injustice.
At present, legal efforts to denote the sanctity of intimate relation-
ships by regulating and restricting the exchange of economic resources
within them appear to systematically perpetuate and exacerbate dis-
tributive inequality for women and poorer people. The law's impulse
to mark the dignity of intimate relationships should be affirmed. But
the distributional consequences of this impulse suggest a need to re-
think how the law marks the significance of intimate relations, in ways
that will help those people who now tend to be deprived by legal acts
of social sanctification. This Article begins that project.
I. CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTS OF THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN INTIMACY AND ECONOMIC EXCHANGE
Many of our existing accounts of the legal regulation of economic
exchange between intimates fit into one of two traditions. The first
tradition, which adopts what might be termed the anticommodifica-
tion position, contends that economic exchange, or "commodification,"
is inappropriate within intimate relations and should not be legally en-
forced. This tradition wants to protect intimate relations from the in-
vasion of legally sanctioned economic exchange. The second tradition,
which adopts what might be termed the pro-market position, asserts
that economic exchange in intimate relations can be a source of equal-
ity and liberty for intimates, and argues that the law should facilitate
and promote such economic exchange. This tradition wants to intro-
duce legally sanctioned economic exchange into intimate relations.
The two traditions have diametrically opposed normative commit-
ments. One criticizes the prospect of legalized commodification within
[Vo1. I1I9:491
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intimate relations; the other endorses it. But both traditions essentially
agree on their positive description of the current state of the law: that
legalized commodification has not yet entered into intimate relations in
a notable way, although it threatens or promises to do so soon. On the
anticommodification side, Michael Walzer identifies marital and paren-
tal rights as spheres in which "monetary exchanges are blocked,
banned, resented, conventionally deplored."1  Elizabeth Anderson
warns of a newfound threat to the "parental norms" now governing
"the ways we allocate and understand parental rights and responsibili-
ties over children": "the encroachment of the market into the sphere of
reproductive labor."'2 Scholars adopting a pro-market position, in turn,
report "the existing law's refusal or, at best, reluctance, to enforce"
economic agreements between intimates,3 and explain "that women's
key problem" in the family "has been too little commodification."4
Both traditions overlook or understate the degree to which legally
regulated and sanctioned economic exchange already exists within in-
timate relationships. As we will see, the crucial issue for the law has
never been whether the legal system will regulate and sanction eco-
nomic exchange between intimates; it is how the law will regulate and
sanction this economic exchange, when, why, in what forms, and for
what purposes.
This is not to say that the law reduces intimate relations to just
economic exchanges, as a third tradition in describing the legal regula-
tion of economic exchange between intimates would assert. The con-
tention, for instance, that marriage is a form of legalized prostitution
has roots in both feminist arguments from the nineteenth and twenti-
eth centuries,5 and the law and economics literature of more recent
1 MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY 97 (1983); see also id. at 101-03.
2 ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 189 (1993).
3 LINDA R. HIRSHMAN & JANE E. LARSON, HARD BARGAINS: THE POLITICS OF SEX
281 (1998).
4 JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND
WHAT To DO ABOUT IT I I8 (2o0o).
5 See Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1373, 1427-33 (2oo0) (describing nineteenth-century debates over marital rape in which
feminists argued that marriage was a form of legalized prostitution); Reva Siegel, Reasoningfrom
the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44
STAN. L. REV. 26i, 3o6-io (1992) (describing nineteenth-century debates over abortion in which
feminists argued that marriage was a form of legalized prostitution). Kathleen Barry offered a
twentieth-century version of the claim:
Marriage and prostitution ... are, in fact, the primary institutions through which
sex is conveyed and in which female sexual slavery is practiced. Sex is purchased
through prostitution and legally acquired through marriage; in both as well as outside
each, it may be seized by force.
2005]
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years. 6 But the relationship between law, economic exchange, and in-
timate relations is more complicated, multifaceted, and subtle than
such reductionist claims suggest.
The legal regulation of economic exchange between intimates does
not simply produce commodification. It produces intimacy as well.
One of the central ways that the law marks the intimacy of a relation-
ship - recognizes its dignity and establishes its distinctiveness from
other relationships - is by regulating how economic resources are ex-
changed within the relationship. The legal regulation of economic ex-
change between intimates, which controls but does not prohibit ex-
change, helps to create and maintain the legal understanding of
intimacy.
II. THE DISTINCTION
BETWEEN SOCIAL AND LEGAL EXCHANGE
Revealing such features of the legal system will require us to exam-
ine the law's regulation of economic exchange in marriage, nonmarital
sexual relationships, and parenthood. Before we do that, however, it is
important to draw a distinction between social exchange and legal
exchange.
By the social exchange of economic assets between intimates, I
mean the exchange of economic assets between intimates that occurs
as a matter of social practice and customary understandings. This ex-
change can take the form of discrete transactions in which specified
assets are transferred or can occur over time as assets go back and
forth within the context of a relationship.
Marriage, as an institution of legalized love, presumes sex as a duty, a wife's re-
sponsibility. Regardless of the mutuality of feeling that may exist when two people enter
marriage, it is often the case that after the original basis for relationship breaks down,
men still assume sex as their automatic right.
KATHLEEN BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY 230 (1979); see also SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR,
THE SECOND SEX 555-56 (H.M. Parshley ed. & trans., Vintage Books 1989) (i949) ("Viewed
from the standpoint of economics, [the prostitute's] position corresponds with that of the married
woman.... For both the sexual act is a service; the one is hired for life by one man; the other has
several clients who pay her by the piece.").
6 Richard Posner has presented a classic version of the claim in law and economics literature
that marriage is a form of legalized prostitution:
In describing prostitution as a substitute for marriage in a society that has a surplus
of bachelors, I may seem to be overlooking a fundamental difference: the "mercenary"
character of the prostitute's relationship with her customer. The difference is not fun-
damental. In a long-term relationship such as marriage, the participants can compen-
sate each other for services performed by performing reciprocal services, so they need
not bother with pricing each service, keeping books of account, and so forth. But in a
spot-market relationship such as a transaction with a prostitute, arranging for reciprocal
services is difficult. It is more efficient for the customer to pay in a medium that the
prostitute can use to purchase services from others.
RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 13i (1992).
[Vo1. 119:491
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By the legal exchange of economic assets between intimates, I
mean the exchange of economic assets between intimates that is recog-
nized and regulated by law. This exchange can also assume the form
of a discrete event or a series of ongoing transactions.
Social and legal exchange are related, with each informing the
other. The law often follows social practice and simultaneously helps
shape social practice. But there are crucial differences between social
and legal exchange. Social exchange is not enforced by the legal sys-
tem and involves no transfer of legal right or entitlement. Legal ex-
change is enforced by the legal system and hinges on the transfer of le-
gal right or entitlement. The law, moreover, does not always abide by
social practices and customary understandings. Intimates may be con-
stantly exchanging economic assets as a matter of social practice and
individual negotiation. Money and goods may be flowing, for exam-
ple, between husbands and wives, and between parents and children.
Yet legal title, claim, or right to those assets is not necessarily circulat-
ing as well. The agreements intimates make between themselves may
be unenforceable in a court of law, and this unenforceability may in
turn influence the frequency and nature of such agreements.
At present, we have a much richer account of the social exchange
of economic assets between intimates. The anthropological literature
on gift exchange, for instance, demonstrates how the social practices
governing the exchange of economic assets between intimates can be a
significant part of what marks a relationship as intimate and differen-
tiates it from other relationships. As this work has shown, the social
exchange of economic assets between intimates often assumes the form
of what one could term structured altruism. A classic definition of al-
truism might be that it is a spontaneous act done selflessly for the wel-
fare of another. Structured altruism, however, is neither entirely spon-
taneous nor entirely selfless. Anthropologists have discovered that
many economic assets are exchanged between intimates in the form of
gifts. This practice of gift exchange, though, involves at least implicit
bargaining and self-interest in addition to altruism. Most gifts are
given under some degree of social compulsion and with the expectation
of receiving something of equivalent or greater value in return. The
reciprocation of gifts - whether in the form of material goods and
services or social rewards, such as higher social status - is virtually
obligatory as a matter of social practice.7 Nonetheless, gift exchange is
7 See, e.g., PETER M. BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE 4 (1964) ("A person
for whom another has done a service is expected to express his gratitude and return a service
when the occasion arises."); MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT. THE FORM AND REASON FOR
EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES 3 (W.D. Halls trans., W.W. Norton 1990) (1950) ("In Scan-
dinavian civilization, and in a good number of others, exchanges and contracts take place in the
form of presents; in theory these are voluntary, in reality they are given and reciprocated obligato-
2005]
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spontaneous relative to alternate forms of economic exchange, such as
exchange specified and enforced by legal contract or legal code. It
marks a relationship differently, signifying and helping to establish the
closeness of the connection between the giver and the recipient.
Viviana Zelizer's sociological investigations similarly reveal that the
social practices surrounding monetary transfers between intimates are
an important means by which the nature of an intimate relationship is
identified and enacted. 8 Zelizer has done fascinating work analyzing
how people think of their monetary transfers within "erotically tinged"
relationships differently, and treat them differently, depending on their
understanding of the precise nature of the relationship at issue. 9 So,
for instance, a person who transfers money to his sexual partner might
understand that money to be a form of compensation if he considers
his partner a prostitute, and the money to be a gift if he considers his
partner a girlfriend. This person, moreover, is likely to employ all
sorts of "symbols, rituals, practices, and physically distinguishable
forms of money" to indicate which of his monetary transfers should be
understood as compensation, which should be understood as a gift,
and which should be understood as something else, such as an entitle-
ment. 10 In so doing, he uses his monetary transfers to denote the spe-
cific nature of his various intimate relationships.1 '
rily."); id. at 14 ("[Elverything - food, women, children, property, talismans, land, labour services,
priestly functions, and ranks - is there for passing on, and for balancing accounts."); Mary Doug-
las, Foreword to id. at vii, ix ("There are no free gifts; gift cycles engage persons in permanent
commitments that articulate the dominant institutions."); C.A. Gregory, Gifts, in 2 THE NEW
PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 524, 524 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987) ("Anthro-
pologists stress that while gifts appear to be voluntary, disinterested and spontaneous, they are in
fact obligatory and interested.").
8 See VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY 3 (2005) ("[A]ll of us use eco-
nomic activity to create, maintain, and renegotiate important ties - especially intimate ties - to
other people."); Viviana A. Zelizer, Intimate Transactions, in THE NEW ECONOMIC
SOCIOLOGY: DEVELOPMENTS IN AN EMERGING FIELD 274, 274 (Mauro F. Guill~n et al. eds.,
2002) ("Transfers of money, far from occurring in an impersonal world, regularly depend on and
define intimate social relations.").
9 Viviana A. Zelizer, The Purchase ofIntimacy, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 817, 818-i9 (2000).
10 Id. at 819.
11 See id. at 842 ("[T]he view of Differentiated Ties claims that monetary transfers and inti-
mate relations, including sexual ties, coexist in a wide variety of contexts and relationships, each
relationship marked by a distinctive form of payment. More generally, this alternative approach
argues that people pour unceasing effort into distinguishing qualitatively different social relation-
ships - including their most intimate ties - from each other by means of well-marked symbols,
rituals, and social practices."); see also ZELIZER, supra note 8, at 41 ("[This book's] analysis of
connected lives shows that across a wide range of intimate relations, in the provision of personal
care, and in the complexities of household life, people manage the mingling of economic activity
and intimacy by creating, enforcing, and renegotiating extensive differentiation among social ties,
their boundaries, and their appropriate matching with commercial media and transactions of pro-
duction, consumption, and distribution.").
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This anthropological and sociological work, however, focuses on
social practices and customary understandings, rather than on the legal
exchange of economic assets between intimates. For example, Zelizer
has insightfully explored the social practices that shape the economic
assets wives are allowed to control in marriage as a matter of custom-
ary understandings. She reports that most married couples do not
treat their income as an undifferentiated whole. Instead, they carefully
earmark and designate specific parts of their income for specific pur-
poses under a specific family member's control, often after consider-
able bargaining.12 These social practices are important, and they help
structure the circulation of economic assets and access to wealth in
marriage. But although economic assets may be circulating to wives
as a matter of social practice and individual negotiation, this does not
mean that wives also have legally enforceable claims to those economic
assets.
The subject of the legal exchange of economic assets between inti-
mates remains underexplored, and it is to this subject that we now
turn.
III. THE LEGAL EXCHANGE
OF ECONOMIC ASSETS BETWEEN INTIMATES
Like many of our social practices, the legal system is also eager to
differentiate intimate relations from other relationships. One promi-
nent way that the law attempts this differentiation is by contending
that intimate relations occupy a sphere of life removed from the mar-
ket. The law conspicuously refuses to enforce specific kinds of eco-
nomic exchange between intimates, while then sanctioning other eco-
nomic exchanges that respond to intimates' material needs. Indeed, it
is a tenet of our legal system that prohibiting certain forms of eco-
nomic exchange between intimates is a crucial means by which the law
recognizes the differences between relationships and preserves the spe-
cialness and dignity of intimate relations.
Consider the law governing economic exchange in marriage, non-
marital sexual relationships, and parenthood.
A. Marriage
The law loudly denies enforcement to a variety of economic ex-
changes between husbands and wives. Courts explain that enforcing
these exchanges would inappropriately insert the market into marital
relations and, in so doing, undermine the distinctiveness and the dig-
nity of marriage.
12 See VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY 4o-66 (I994); see also
ZELIZER, supra note 8, at 218-21.
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For example, interspousal contracts for domestic services are unen-
forceable. 13 In these contracts, one spouse agrees to perform house-
hold labor for the other spouse in exchange for monetary or other eco-
nomic compensation. Some of the explanations that courts offer for
their refusal to enforce such contracts reason in terms of the law gov-
erning market transactions.1 4 Courts contend, for instance, that inter-
spousal contracts for domestic services are unenforceable because each
spouse owes a preexisting duty to provide domestic services to the
other and thus supplies no consideration in contracting to perform
those services.15  However, another theme in the case law, increasingly
prominent in recent years, holds that it is contrary to public policy to
have market relations in the family and to apply the law governing
market transactions to interspousal agreements. Courts declare that
enforcing interspousal contracts for domestic services would violate
the norms of love that are supposed to govern marital relations, norms
that assertedly require wholly altruistic exchange. They stress that
they are upholding the separation between marriage and the market to
respect and safeguard the specialness of the marital relation. Spouses
cannot "be treated just like any other parties haggling at arm's length,"
courts explain.' 6  To enforce interspousal contracts for domestic ser-
vices would be "to place the marriage relation on too much of a com-
mercial basis, and to treat the marital relation as any other business
13 See, e.g., Mays v. Wade], 236 N.E.2d 18o, 183 (Ind. App. 1968) ("It is the law of this State
that between husband and wife, while they are living together as such in a common household,
that there can be no express or implied contract for compensation or payment for any services or
acts performed or rendered in and about the home by either of them in the common support of
that household."); cases cited infra notes I5-18; Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital
Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to Earnings, r86o-r93o, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2197 n.248
(1994) (collecting cases).
14 See Siegel, supra note 13, at 2 198-2206 (discussing the "contractarian and anticontractarianjustifications" that courts advance for refusing to enforce interspousal contracts for domestic
services).
15 See Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d i6, 20 (Ct. App. 1993) ("Personal performance of a
personal duty created by the contract of marriage does not constitute a new consideration sup-
porting the indebtedness alleged in this case."); Dep't of Human Res. v. Williams, 202 S.E.2d 504,
507 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973) ("The services undertaken by the wife, which were not sufficient consid-
eration, were 'ordinary household duties."'); State v. Bachmann, 521 N.W.2d 886, 888 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1994) ("Bachmann has an obligation to care for her children regardless of whether she is
paid to do so."); Church v. Church, 630 P.2d 1243, 1250 (N.M. Ct. App. ig8i) ("Under Virginia
law a wife has a duty to provide household services to her husband and the husband has a duty to
support his wife .... Having a duty to provide the services of a wife, those services are not a basis
for relief for fraud, or breach of contract, or for an equitable award based on unjust enrichment."(citing Hall v. Stewart, 116 S.E. 469 (Va. 1923))); Kuder v. Schroeder, 430 S.E.2d 271, 273 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1993) ("Under the law of this State, there is a personal duty of each spouse to support the
other, a duty arising from the marital relationship, and carrying with it the corollary right to sup-
port from the other spouse. So long as the coverture endures, this duty of support may not be ab-
rogated or modified by the agreement of the parties to a marriage." (citation omitted)).
16 Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20.
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association, whereby each expects to obtain material advantage from
the marriage. This is not, in our opinion, the true concept of the rela-
tion. 1 7  "[E]ven if few things are left that cannot command a price,
marital support remains one of them." 8
Interspousal contracts about sex are also unenforceable. The case
law on this subject is much less developed than the jurisprudence on
interspousal contracts for domestic services. But in denying enforce-
ment to an interspousal contract about sex, a court has again empha-
sized the need to differentiate marriage from other relationships and
preserve its uniqueness. The court held that sex is one of the "marital
obligations" that spouses cannot agree to "repeal or amend," and ex-
plained that this inability to alter obligations by contract distinguishes
marriage from other, commercial relations between people who might
"agree to live in the same building," such as "domestic em-
ployer-employee, or landlord-tenant." 19
The same effort to set marriage apart from other relationships and
affirm its importance is visible in the many cases that refuse to treat
human capital as marital or community property subject to distribu-
tion at divorce. In these divorce cases, one spouse has helped the other
spouse acquire significant human capital by, for instance, financing the
other spouse's professional education, and the supporting spouse now
claims an interest in the value of the professional degree or other hu-
man capital.2 0 The courts that hold that human capital is not marital
or community property to be valued and divided at divorce sometimes
use the language of economics to explain their decisions, contending
that human capital is too hard to appraise, too speculative in value,
and too ephemeral in nature.2 1 But as frequently, these courts insist
17 Dade v. Anderson, 439 S.E.2d 353, 356 (Va. 1994) (quoting Alexander v. Kuykendall, 63
S.E.2d 746, 747 (Va. 195 )) (internal quotation mark omitted).
18 Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 2o; see also In re Estate of Lord, 602 P.2d 1030, 1031 (N.M.
1979) ("It is the policy of this state to foster and protect the marriage institution. It is not the pol-
icy of the state to encourage spouses to marry for money.").
19 Favrot v. Barnes, 332 So. 2d 873, 875 (La. Ct. App.), rev'd in part on other grounds, 339 So.
2d 843 (La. 1976).
20 See, e.g., DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 758 (Minn. i98i) ("The case at bar pre-
sents the common situation where one spouse has foregone the immediate enjoyment of earned
income to enable the other to pursue an advanced education on a full-time basis. Typically, this
sacrifice is made with the expectation that the parties will enjoy a higher standard of living in the
future. Because the income of the working spouse is used for living expenses, there is usually lit-
tle accumulated marital property to be divided when the dissolution occurs prior to the attain-
ment of the financial rewards concomitant with the advanced degree or professional license.").
21 See Wisner v. Wisner, 63, P.2d 115, 122 (Ariz. Ct. App. 198i) ("[E]ducation is an intangible
property right, the value of which, because of its character, cannot properly be characterized as
property subject to division between the spouses."); In re Marriage of Olar, 747 P.2d 676, 679-8o
(Colo. 1987) (en banc) ("The Maryland Court of Appeals noted that.., the future enhanced in-
come resulting from a professional degree is a 'mere expectancy.' The New Jersey Supreme Court
stated that '[a] professional license or degree represents the opportunity to obtain an amount of
20051
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that the best way to recognize and uphold the specialness of the mari-
tal relationship is by refusing to reason about the exchanges between
husbands and wives in economic terms. Courts contend that a legal
regime that recognized human capital as marital or community prop-
erty divisible at divorce would reduce marriage to an economic rela-
tion and an economic bargain. It would treat spouses "as though they
were strictly business partners, one of whom has made a calculated in-
vestment in the commodity of the other's professional training, expect-
ing a dollar for dollar return. 2 2  It "would diminish the individual
personalities of the husband and wife to economic entities and reduce
the institution of marriage to that of a closely held corporation. '23
Yet while the law of marriage directs attention to its refusal to en-
force certain economic transactions between husbands and wives, it
does not deny legal recognition to all forms of economic exchange
within marriage. Instead, the law enforces economic exchanges within
marriage selectively. It establishes that spouses' material needs may
be met in some ways, but not others. This legal practice is meant to
recognize the distinctive nature of marriage. It also, of course, creates
and determines the nature of the marital relationship at the same time.
The economic exchanges that the law upholds within marriage
tend to share one or two characteristics. First, courts tend to under-
stand these exchanges as recognizing the joint interests of husbands
and wives, rather than promoting the separate, and potentially con-
flicting, interests of one spouse against the other. Second, the sanc-
tioned economic exchanges tend not to take the form of direct, specific
money only upon the occurrence of highly uncertain future events.' . .. We agree with this analy-
sis, and therefore reaffirm our holding... that an educational degree is not marital property."
(alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Archer v. Archer, 493 A.2d 1074, 1079 (Md.
1985); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 531 (N.J. 1982))); Mahoney, 453 A.2d at 531-32 ("A
professional license or degree is a personal achievement of the holder. It cannot be sold and its
value cannot readily be determined. A professional license or degree represents the opportunity to
obtain an amount of money only upon the occurrence of highly uncertain future events. .... The
value of a professional degree for purposes of property distribution is nothing more than the pos-
sibility of enhanced earnings that the particular academic credential will provide.... The amount
of future earnings would be entirely speculative."); Hoak v. Hoak, 370 S.E.2d 473, 476-77 (W. Va.
1988) ("[T]he value of a professional degree is the value of the enhanced earning capacity of the
degree-holder. Not only is that value speculative, but also it represents money or assets earned
after dissolution of the marriage." (footnote omitted)); DeWitt v. DeWitt, 296 N.W.2d 761, 767
(Wis. Ct. App. I98O) ("We cannot agree ... that equity is served by attempting to place a dollar
value on something so intangible as a professional education, degree, or license.").
22 DeWitt, 296 N.W.2d at 767.
23 Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 661 P2d 196, 207 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); see also Mahoney, 453 A.2d at
533 ("Marriage is not a business arrangement in which the parties keep track of debits and cred-
its, their accounts to be settled upon divorce. Rather, as we have said, 'marriage is a shared en-
terprise, a joint undertaking ... in many ways it is akin to a partnership."' (omission in original)
(quoting Rothman v. Rothman, 320 A.2d 496, 501 (N.J. 1974))); Hoak, 370 S.E.2d at 478 ("Mar-
riage is not a business arrangement, and this Court would be loathe to promote any more tallying
of respective debits and credits than already occurs in the average household.").
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transfers - of this compensation for that work - and in this way
bear less resemblance to prototypical economic transfers in the market.
The doctrine of necessaries, for instance, provides that one spouse
has no right to sue the other spouse directly for support, but does have
a marital support right that is enforceable through third parties. Un-
der the doctrine, if one spouse purchases a necessity from a third party,
such as a merchant or a hospital, the third party may sue the other
spouse for payment. As a practical matter, the doctrine of necessaries
enforces economic exchanges between spouses. The doctrine gives
each spouse a legally enforceable right to receive support from the
other spouse in return for marital services rendered over the course of
the relationship. The courts upholding this doctrine, however, stress
its compatibility with the notion that a married couple should be
treated as a unit before the law. Indeed, the doctrine of necessaries
makes the debt of one spouse the debt of the other, while prohibiting
direct interspousal litigation. As courts endorsing the doctrine of ne-
cessaries explain, the doctrine benefits "the institution of marriage" by
recognizing that "marriage involves shared wealth, expenses, rights,
and duties." 24 The doctrine upholds the "view that 'marriage is a
shared enterprise, a joint undertaking,' 2 5 and thus "flows from the na-
ture of the marital relationship itself.
'26
Similarly, a person whose spouse is injured by a third party may
sue the third party for the loss of marital consortium and obtain dam-
ages for injuries to the marital relationship, including the loss or di-
minishment of marital sex. 7 The marital consortium doctrine means
24 N.C. Baptist Hosps., Inc. v. Harris, 354 S.E.2d 471, 474 (N.C. 1987).
25 Jersey Shore Med. Ctr.-Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 417 A.2d 1003, I0io (N.J. i98o)
(quoting Rothman, 320 A.2d at 5oi); see also Landmark Med. Ctr. v. Gauthier, 635 A.2d 1i45,
1152 (R.I. 1994) ("We embrace the New Jersey court's characterization of a modern marriage as a
'shared enterprise, a joint undertaking .... ' (quoting Jersey Shore Med. Ctr.-Fitkin Hosp., 417
A.2d at ioio)).
26 Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 618 N.E.2d i, 5 (Ind. 1993).
27 See, e.g., Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462, 465 (Alaska 1974) ("A claim for relief for loss of
consortium provides a means of recovery for an injury not otherwise compensable. It should be
recognized as 'compensating the injured party's spouse for interference with the continuance of a
healthy and happy marital life."' (quoting Millington v. Se. Elevator Co., 239 N.E.2d 897, 900
(N.Y. 1968))); Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 525 P.2d 669, 684 (Cal. 1974) (in bank) ("The
concept of consortium includes not only loss of support or services, it also embraces such elements
as love, companionship, affection, society, sexual relations, solace and more." (quoting Millington,
239 N.E.2d at 899) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lacy v. G.D. Searle & Co., 484 A.2d 527,
532 (Del. Super. Ct. 1984) ("Generally, damages for loss of consortium ... encompass loss of soci-
ety, companionship, affection, and sexual relations."); Olsen v. Bell Tel. Labs., Inc., 445 N.E.2d
6o9, 613 (Mass. 2983) ("Consortium includes the companionship, affection, and sexual enjoyment
of one's spouse."); Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 266 S.E.2d 818, 81g (N.C.
i98o) ("[T]he essence of consortium today has become the mutual right of a husband and wife to
the society, companionship, comfort and affection of one another. Unquestionably, this society
and companionship includes a sexual component." (citations omitted)); Clouston v. Remlinger
Oldsmobile Cadillac, Inc., 258 N.E.2d 230, 232 (Ohio 2970) ("'Consortium' consists of society, ser-
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that when a married person is injured, that injured person is not enti-
tled to receive all the monetary compensation the tortfeasor pays for
the injury. Some of the compensation will go to the injured person's
spouse, who is entitled to be paid for being unable to have sex with the
injured person. This willingness to direct some of the compensation
the tortfeasor pays to the injured person's spouse as economic compen-
sation for the loss or diminishment of marital sex stands in stark con-
trast to the courts' refusal to enforce interspousal contracts about
marital sex.2 8 Yet the marital consortium doctrine does not allow di-
rect suits between spouses that would transfer money directly from one
spouse to the other for the loss of sex. 9 Instead, the marital consor-
tium doctrine allows each spouse to bring suit against the third party
tortfeasor. In this posture, courts hold that monetary compensation for
the loss of sexual services in marriage is appropriate, explaining that
money "is the only known means" of compensation that the legal sys-
tem has available.30 In fact, courts reason that the right to sue for the
loss of consortium, which is available to spouses but often unavailable
vices, sexual relations and conjugal affection which includes companionship, comfort, love and
solace."); Peeples v. Sargent, 253 N.W.2d 459, 471 (Wis. 1977) ("Consortium involves a broad
range of elements such as love, companionship, affection, society, sexual relations, and the right of
support or the performance of marital services, any one of which is sufficient to constitute a cause
of action." (quoting Schwartz v. Milwaukee, i95 N.W.2d 480, 484 (Wis. 1972)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
28 See supra text accompanying note 19.
29 See Cook v. Hanover Ins. Co., 592 N.E.2d 773, 775 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) ("We are not
aware of a case in any jurisdiction which has allowed one spouse to sue the other for loss of con-
sortium.").
30 Rodriguez, 525 P.2d at 682 (quoting Millington, 239 N.E.2d at 902) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Hopson v. St. Mary's Hosp., 408 A.2d 260, 264 (Conn. 1979) ("The diffi-
culty of assessing damages for loss of consortium is not a proper reason for denying the existence
of such a cause of action inasmuch as the 'logic of [that reasoning] would also hold a jury incom-
petent to award damages for pain and suffering."' (alteration in original) (quoting Millington, 239
N.E.2d at 902)); Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 302 N.E.2d 555, 563 (Mass. 1973) ("The marital interest is
quite recognizable and its impairment may be definite, serious, and enduring, more so than the
pain and suffering or mental or psychic distress for which recovery is now almost routinely al-
lowed in various tort actions. The valuation problem here may be difficult but is not less man-
ageable."); Clouston, 258 N.E.2d at 234 ("The argument is likewise made that a loss of consor-
tium, exclusive of loss of services, is not measurable by a jury and, therefore, such an action
should not be allowed to a wife. Yet, in the recognized action for loss of consortium based upon
an intentional tort, this question must be presented to and decided by the jury, whether a husband
or a wife brings the action."); Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Tex. 1978) ("It has been
argued that the deprived spouse's loss of consortium is an injury that is too indirect to be com-
pensated because the elements involved are too intangible or conjectural to be measured in pecu-
niary terms by a jury. We do not agree, for to do so would mean that a jury would also be in-
competent to award damages for pain and suffering. The character of harm to the intangible or
sentimental elements is not illusory. The loss of companionship, emotional support, love, felicity,
and sexual relations are real, direct, and personal losses. It is recognized that these terms concern
subjective states which present some difficulty in translating the loss into a dollar amount. The
loss, however, is a real one requiring compensation .... " (citations omitted)).
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to people in other relationships, acknowledges the specialness of the
marital relationship, which one consortium decision has called "the pri-
mary familial interest recognized by the courts."
'31
In addition, prenuptial and postnuptial agreements about property
distribution are enforceable. Husbands and wives have wide-ranging
authority to contract about how to distribute their property during
marriage and at divorce. Prenuptial and postnuptial agreements about
property distribution can obviously be a tremendous source of conflict
both when negotiated and when enforced, and they were originally
unenforceable at common law as contrary to public policy.32 But
modern courts contend that prenuptial and postnuptial agreements
about property distribution may actually encourage marriage (if the
parties are not already married) and facilitate the stableness of a mari-
tal relationship in an era in which no-fault divorce is available and di-
vorce rates are high. As these courts explain, "without the ability to
order their own affairs as they wish, many people may simply forgo
marriage for more 'informal' relationships. ' '33  Once a couple is mar-
ried, moreover, "a contract which defines the expectations and re-
31 Whittlesey, 572 S.W.2d at 666; see also Lacy, 484 A.2d at 532 ("The spouse who asserts loss
of consortium need not have any physical proximity to the site of the injury because the envelop-
ing status which arises from that marriage status qualifies the spouse to assert the action. This
status contrasts with even other family relationships, such as that of parent and child, where no
comparable cause of action exists and each non-spouse family member must meet the 'zone of
danger' test."); Nicholson, 266 S.E.2d at 822-23 ("If a loss of consortium is seen not only as a loss
of service but as a loss of legal sexual intercourse and general companionship, society and affec-
tion as well, by definition any damage to consortium is limited to the legal marital partner of the
injured. Strangers to the marriage partnership cannot maintain such an action, and there is no
need to worry about extension of proximate causation to parties far removed from the injury."
(footnote omitted)).
32 See Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P2d 1044, 1048 (Alaska 1987) ("The traditional common law
view was that prenuptial agreements in contemplation of divorce ... were inconsistent with the
sanctity of marriage and the state's interest in preserving marriage and maintaining the financial
security of divorced persons."); Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 382 (Fla. 1970) ("It has long been
the rule in a majority of the courts of this country and in this State that contracts intended to fa-
cilitate or promote the procurement of a divorce will be declared illegal as contrary to public pol-
icy."); Scherer v. Scherer, 292 S.E.2d 662, 664 (Ga. 1982) ("In the past, there has been virtually
unanimous agreement in all jurisdictions that prenuptial agreements purporting to settle alimony
in the event of a future divorce are void ab initio as against public policy since they were consid-
ered to be in contemplation of divorce." (quoting Robert 0. Davies, Validity of Prenuptial Con-
tracts Which Fix Alimony, 14 GA. ST. B.J. I8, i8 (i977)) (internal quotation marks omitted));
Bratton v. Bratton, 136 S.W.3d 595, 599-6oo (Tenn. 2004) ("Although postnuptial agreements
were void and of no effect under the common law, most states to address the issue have now de-
termined such agreements to be valid.").
33 Brooks, 733 P.2d at io5o; see also Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728, 731 (Colo. 1982) (en
banc) ("Undeniably, some marriages would not come about if antenuptial agreements were not
available. This may be increasingly true due to the frequency of marriage dissolutions in our so-
ciety, and the fact that many people marry more than once.").
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sponsibilities of the parties promotes rather than reduces marital
stability. "34
A spouse also has a right to alimony at divorce, if she can demon-
strate need, an inability to support herself, and that the wealthier
spouse can afford to pay the alimony after meeting his own needs. 35
Alimony is an economic exchange of services rendered in marriage for
support after marriage, but in a number of ways it does not resemble
typical economic exchanges in the market. A key feature of alimony is
that it is not based on anything specific the recipient did during mar-
riage, except be married and (sometimes) not be at fault for the di-
vorce. 36  Alimony does not assume the form of a direct and exact
34 Volid v. Volid, 286 N.E.2d 42, 46 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972); see also In re Marriage of Dawley, 55I
P2d 323, 333 (Cal. 1976) (in bank) ("Neither the reordering of property rights to fit the needs and
desires of the couple, nor realistic planning that takes account of the possibility of dissolution, of-
fends the public policy favoring and protecting marriage."); Newman, 653 P.2d at 732 ("[S]uch
planning brings a greater stability to the marriage relation by protecting the financial expectations
of the parties, and does not necessarily encourage or contribute to dissolution."); In re Marriage of
Boren, 475 N.E.2d 690, 694 (Ind. 1985) ("Two of the significant changes in the institution of mar-
riage and marriage laws in recent years are the increase in the number of divorces and the imple-
mentation of 'no-fault' divorce laws. A natural consequence of the increased number of divorces
is the increased incidence of subsequent marriages. As more and more persons, especially those
who are older and have children from previous marriages, enter into subsequent marriages, they
may wish to protect their property interests for the benefit of themselves and/or their children.
Such agreements can only promote or facilitate marital stability by settling the expectations and
responsibilities of the parties."); In re Estate of Beat, 13o N.W.2d 739, 746 (Wis. 1964) ("In up-
holding the validity of this ... postnuptial agreement we are embracing a policy that favors mar-
riage and works for its stability.").
35 See Noah v. Noah, 491 So. 2d 1124, 1127 (Fla. 1986) ("[T]he primary standards to be used in
fashioning an equitable alimony award are the needs of one spouse and the ability of the other to
pay."); In re Marriage of Hochleutner, 633 N.E.2d 164, 168 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) ("Section 504(a)
further provides that maintenance may be paid from the income or property of the other spouse
after consideration of all the relevant factors including, among others, such things as the income
and property of each party; the needs of each party; the present and future earning capacity of
each party; any impairment of a party having foregone or delayed education due to the marriage;
the time necessary to enable the party seeking maintenance to acquire appropriate education,
training and employment; the standard of living established during the marriage; the duration of
the marriage; the age, physical and emotional condition of both parties; and any other factor that
the court expressly finds to be just and equitable."); Heins v. Ledis, 664 N.E.2d Io, 16 (Mass.
1996) ("An award of alimony is improper absent a finding of financial need on the part of the re-
cipient spouse."); Perlberger v. Perlberger, 626 A.2d 1186, 1203 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) ("Alimony is
based upon reasonable needs in accordance with the lifestyle and standard of living established by
the parties during the marriage, as well as the payor's ability to pay."); Ramsbottom v. Ramsbot-
tom, 542 A.2d 1O98, i ioo (R.I. 1988) ("This court has consistently held that alimony is considered
a rehabilitative tool designed to provide economic support for a dependent spouse and is based
upon need."); Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d I93, 198 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("The trial court must
consider three factors in fixing a reasonable alimony award to the receiving spouse: [i] the finan-
cial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; [2] the ability of the receiving spouse to produce
a sufficient income; and [3] the ability of the supporting spouse to provide support.").
36 See Burns v. Burns, 847 S.W.2d 23, 27 (Ark. 1993) ("Fault is not a factor in deciding
whether to award alimony unless it relates to need or the ability to pay. The fault of the wife in
this case is not relevant to the decision to award alimony to her. The ability of a party to pay and
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transfer of payment for labor. A spouse does not have to perform any
particular work to receive alimony, and even if she does undertake
significant labor for her spouse during marriage, she will not necessar-
ily receive alimony at divorce. Instead, her current situation must sat-
isfy requirements, such as need and the inability to provide for her
own support, that are much more loosely connected to work completed
within and outside of marriage. As courts note, "[a]limony is not a
matter of right. ' '37  Alimony has status rather than contract as its
model.
In sum, the law of marriage is centrally concerned with distinguish-
ing marriage from other relationships. It is confident, moreover, that
one of the best ways to differentiate marriage is to proclaim marriage's
separation from the market and to refuse enforcement to certain eco-
nomic exchanges between husbands and wives. The law of marriage
prominently denies recognition to some interspousal economic ex-
changes, while simultaneously enforcing other economic exchanges
that the legal system understands to be more compatible with the dis-
tinctiveness and specialness of the marital relationship.
B. Nonmarital Sexual Relationships
The law governing nonmarital sexual relationships also devotes
enormous energy to differentiating between relationships. It too oper-
ates on the assumption that a critical way to establish the worth and
dignity of an intimate relation is to stress the relation's detachment
from the market and to prohibit some forms of economic exchange be-
tween intimates.
Most notably, courts are intent on distinguishing nonmarital sexual
relationships from prostitution and so ardently declare their refusal to
enforce contracts between unmarried sexual partners that use sex as
consideration. In reviewing any contract between unmarried sexual
the need of the other party are primary factors to be considered in awarding alimony." (citation
omitted)); Ianitelli v. lanitelli, 502 N.W.2d 691, 692 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (per curiam) ("A divorce
court has the discretion to award alimony. . . 'as it considers just and reasonable' in light of all
the circumstances. The court should consider the length of the marriage, the parties' ability to
pay, their past relations and conduct, their ages, needs, ability to work, health, and fault, if any."
(citation omitted) (quoting Demman v. Demman, 489 N.W.2d 161, 163 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992)));
Wood v. Wood, 495 So. 2d 503, 5o6 (Miss. 1986) ("Even in cases where the wife has been guilty of
fault justifying granting the husband a divorce, alimony, if allowed at all, should be reasonable in
amount, commensurate with the wife's accustomed standard of living, minus her own resources,
and considering the ability of the husband to pay."); Kover v. Kover, 278 N.E.2d 886, 889 (N.Y.
1972) ("In addition to 'the length of time of the marriage [and] the ability of the wife to be self
supporting' . . . the courts have indicated a number of other circumstances to be taken into ac-
count in fixing alimony. These include the husband's financial resources and the established
standard of living of the parties; the age and health of the parties and, to a limited extent, their
conduct." (citations omitted)).
37 Friedlander v. Friedlander, 494 P.2d 208, 211 (Wash. 1972) (en banc).
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partners, a court will first sever any aspect of the contract based on the
exchange of sexual services for economic compensation. If the sexual
aspect of the contract cannot be severed, the contract will not be en-
forced.3 8 Courts contend that severing the sexual aspect of a contract
between unmarried sexual partners is necessary in order to differenti-
ate the nonmarital sexual relationship from prostitution: "[A]dults who
voluntarily live together and engage in sexual relations ... cannot law-
fully contract to pay for the performance of sexual services, for such a
contract is, in essence, an agreement for prostitution and unlawful for
that reason. ' '39 At the same time, courts assume that the sexual aspect
of a contract between unmarried sexual partners can often be severed.
Courts reason that if the law took the view that the sexual aspect of a
contract between unmarried sexual partners can never be severed -
that a sex-for-money exchange is an inextricable part of any contract
between unmarried sexual partners - that would mean that the law
classifies and treats relationships between unmarried sexual partners
38 See Cook v. Cook, 691 P.2d 664, 669 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc) ("If the agreement is independ-
ent, in the sense that it is made for a proper consideration, it is enforceable even though the par-
ties are in a meretricious relationship. That relationship will not prevent enforcement of the
agreement unless the relationship is the consideration for the agreement."); Marvin v. Marvin, 557
P2d io6, 114 (Cal. 1976) (in bank) ("[A] contract between nonmarital partners will be enforced
unless expressly and inseparably based upon an illicit consideration of sexual services .... ");
Tyranski v. Piggins, 205 N.W.2d 595, 596 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973) ("Professor Corbin and the draft-
ers of the Restatement of Contracts both write that . . . bargains in whole or in part in considera-
tion of an illicit relationship are unenforceable .... "); Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1156
(N.Y. I98O) ("New York courts have long accepted the concept that an express agreement between
unmarried persons living together is as enforceable as though they were not living together, pro-
vided only that illicit sexual relations were not 'part of the consideration of the contract."' (foot-
note omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Rhodes v. Stone, 17 N.Y.S. 561, 562 (Gen. Term 1892)));
Suggs v. Norris, 364 S.E.2d i59, 162 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) ("[A]greements regarding the finances
and property of an unmarried but cohabiting couple, whether express or implied, are enforceable
as long as sexual services or promises thereof do not provide the consideration for such agree-
ments."); Latham v. Latham, 547 P.2d 144, 147 (Or. 1976) (in banc) ("We are not validating an
agreement in which the only or primary consideration is sexual intercourse. The agreement here
contemplated all the burdens and amenities of married life."); Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303,
3 11 (Wis. 1987) ("Courts have generally refused to enforce contracts for which the sole considera-
tion is sexual relations, sometimes referred to as 'meretricious' relationships. Courts distinguish,
however, between contracts that are explicitly and inseparably founded on sexual services and
those that are not. This court, and numerous other courts, have concluded that 'a bargain be-
tween two people is not illegal merely because there is an illicit relationship between the two so
long as the bargain is independent of the illicit relationship and the illicit relationship does not
constitute any part of the consideration bargained for and is not a condition of the bargain."'
(footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting In re Estate of Steffes, 290 N.W.2d 697, 709 (Wis.
1980))).
39 Marvin, 557 P2d at 1i6; see also Glasgo v. Glasgo, 41o N.E.2d 1325, 1331 (Ind. Ct. App.
i98o) ("Our most recent criminal code does not attempt to proscribe sexual conduct between con-
senting adults in private (see Ind.Code 35-42-4-2), although it does still proscribe acts of prostitu-
tion (Ind.Code 35-45-4-2). Thus, any contract in which sexual services serve as consideration are
[sic] unenforceable and void as against public policy. However, even though such part of a con-
tract may be void, courts may excise the illegal segment and enforce the other provisions.").
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as if they are always relations of prostitution, which they are not. To
the contrary, the distinction between nonmarital sexual relationships
and prostitution is exactly what the law strives to maintain. As one
court explained, "[t]o equate the nonmarital relationship of today to
[prostitution] is to do violence to an accepted and wholly different
practice.4 0
But while courts emphasize the difference between nonmarital sex-
ual relationships and the market relations of prostitution, the law does
uphold a variety of economic exchanges between unmarried sexual
partners. One feature that the sanctioned economic exchanges have in
common is that courts believe that these exchanges recognize, respect,
and even reinforce appropriate distinctions between relationships, es-
pecially the distinction between nonmarital sexual relationships and
marriage.
For instance, courts enforce contracts between unmarried sexual
partners for the exchange of property or money. Courts note that en-
forcing such contracts protects the people who have made and relied
upon the contracts.4 1 But courts stress that the enforceability of non-
marital contracts for property or monetary exchange preserves the dis-
tinction between marriage and nonmarital sexual relationships because
it creates a set of rules for governing the property and monetary trans-
actions of unmarried sexual partners that is different from the rules
that control the distribution of money and property within marriage.
Stated in the most general terms, the law governing marriage auto-
matically establishes economic interconnections between spouses and
40 Marvin, 557 P.2d at 122; see also Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 403 A.2d 902, 909 (N.J. 1979)
(Pashman, J., concurring) ("In recent years, cohabitation between unmarried adults has become an
increasingly prevalent phenomenon. To label such conduct as 'meretricious' - that is, as akin to
prostitution - would ignore the realities of today's society. It is likely true that all such under-
standings between nonmarital partners involve in some way a mutual sexual relationship or at
least contemplate its existence. This, however, does not make their conduct the equivalent of
prostitution - whatever might be one's view as to its 'morality."'); Morone, 413 N.E.2d at 1'56
n.2 ("Much of the case law speaks of such a relationship as 'meretricious'. Defined as 'Of or per-
taining to a prostitute; having a harlot's traits' (Webster's Third New International Dictionary
Unabridged, p. 1413), that word's pejorative sense makes it no longer, if it ever was, descriptive of
the relationship under consideration, and we, therefore, decline to use it.").
41 See Cook, 691 P.2d at 670 ("The rule of non-enforcement thus favors the strongest, the most
unscrupulous, the one better prepared to take advantage or the more cunning of the cohabitants.
We do not believe this rule to be equitable or good public policy. We think the better rule is sim-
ply that valid agreements made by the parties will be enforced according to the intent of the par-
ties."); Hay v. Hay, 678 P.2d 672, 674 (Nev. 1984) ("We recognize that the state has a strong public
policy interest in encouraging legal marriage. We do not, however, believe that policy is well
served by allowing one participant in a meretricious relationship to abscond with the bulk of the
couple's acquisitions."); Watts, 405 N.W.2d at 311 ("While not condoning the illicit sexual relation-
ship of the parties, many courts have recognized that the result of a court's refusal to enforce con-
tract and property rights between unmarried cohabitants is that one party keeps all or most of the
assets accumulated during the relationship, while the other party, no more or less 'guilty,' is de-
prived of property which he or she has helped to accumulate.").
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then gives spouses some contractual ability to alter those interconnec-
tions through, for example, prenuptial or postnuptial agreements about
property distribution. 42  Unmarried sexual partners, in contrast, have
to contract if they wish to establish legally enforceable economic inter-
connections. The rules that automatically govern a marital relation do
not bind or protect them. As courts explain, enforcing contracts be-
tween unmarried sexual partners for property or monetary exchange
does not give those partners "the benefit of community property rights,
since these rights derive solely from the marital relationship. '43  Un-
married sexual partners may be able to contract about money and
property, but "[t]he rights and obligations that attend a valid marriage
simply do not arise where the parties choose to cohabit outside the
marital relationship."'4 4
Similarly, contracts between unmarried sexual partners for domes-
tic services are enforceable. Here, too, courts insist that upholding
contracts between unmarried sexual partners preserves the distinction
between marriage and nonmarital sexual relationships because unmar-
ried sexual partners are not governed by the rules regulating mar-
riage.45  Indeed, as courts observe, the enforceability of contracts be-
tween unmarried sexual partners for domestic services contrasts
sharply with the law's refusal to enforce such contracts between
spouses. 46  Courts also assert that enforcing nonmarital contracts for
domestic services preserves incentives to marry. They explain that the
opposite rule, refusing to enforce such contracts, would give an unmar-
ried partner who receives but does not perform domestic services a
strong incentive to remain unmarried, because then he could avoid in-
curring both contractual obligations to pay for domestic services and
the financial obligations associated with marriage. As these courts
reason, "[a] harsh, per se rule that the contract and property rights of
unmarried cohabiting parties will not be recognized might actually en-
42 See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
43 Cook, 691 P.2d at 668.
44 Boland v. Catalano, 521 A.2d 142, 145 (Conn. 1987).
45 See, e.g., Carroll v. Lee, 712 P.2d 923, 929 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc) ("This opinion does not dis-
courage or shake the foundation of marriage in this state .... This Court recognizes that commu-
nity property rights derive solely from the marital relationship, and the law will not give
non-marital cohabiting parties the benefit of community property." (citations omitted)).
46 See Watkins v. Watkins, 192 Cal. Rptr. 54, 56 (Ct. App. 1983) ("Sonnicksen represents an
application of the rule that 'a married woman cannot contract with her husband with respect to
domestic services which are incidental to [the] marital status, since such contracts are against
public policy.' . ..[T]he complaint [here] alleges an implied agreement based on activities, assur-
ances and services rendered prior to marriage, not during marriage. Since the implied agreement,
as pleaded, does not require that domestic services be rendered during the marriage for considera-
tion, the rule of Sonnicksen ... is inapposite." (first alteration in original) (footnote omitted)
(quoting Brooks v. Brooks, 119 P.2d 970, 972 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941)) (citing In re Sonnicksen's
Estate, 73 P.2d 643 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937))); supra text accompanying notes 13-18.
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courage a partner with greater income potential to avoid marriage in
order to retain all accumulated assets, leaving the other party with
nothing."47
Like the law of marriage, the law on nonmarital sexual relation-
ships is determined to uphold the distinctions between different kinds
of relationships and certain that one of the most effective means of ac-
complishing this differentiation is to accentuate and reinforce the sepa-
ration between intimate and market relations. The law regulating
unmarried sexual partners conspicuously denies enforcement to some
economic exchanges between intimates in order to stress and preserve
the distinction between nonmarital sexual relationships and prostitu-
tion, while simultaneously sanctioning other economic exchanges that
the courts understand to accord with, or even advance, appropriate
differentiation between nonmarital sexual relationships and marriage.
C. Parenthood
The same pattern holds in the law of parenthood, the final body of
law that we will examine in this Part. This body of law is also fiercely
committed to differentiating between relationships and convinced that
one of the best ways to distinguish and respect an intimate relation is
to insist upon and expand the distance between intimacy and econom-
ics. The law of parenthood seeks to promote the specialness and dig-
nity of the parent-child relation by stressing its removal from the mar-
ket and refusing to enforce certain economic transactions.
Most prominently, the law prohibits selling and buying children.
Courts reason that such transactions ignore the child's best interests
and may be contrary to the interests of the selling and receiving par-
ents as well.48 Courts emphasize, moreover, that selling and purchas-
ing children violates the norms of love that should govern parenthood,
norms assertedly opposed to economic exchange. They take as given
47 Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 312 (Wis. 1987); see also Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d io6,
122 (Cal. 1976) (in bank) ("The argument that granting remedies to the nonmarital partners would
discourage marriage must fail; as Cary pointed out, 'with equal or greater force the point might be
made that the pre-197o rule was calculated to cause the income producing partner to avoid mar-
riage and thus retain the benefit of all of his or her accumulated earnings."' (quoting In re Mar-
riage of Cary, io9 Cal. Rptr. 862, 866 (Ct. App. 1973))).
48 See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1241-42 (N.J. 1988) ("The evils inherent in baby-
bartering are loathsome for a myriad of reasons. The child is sold without regard for whether the
purchasers will be suitable parents. The natural mother does not receive the benefit of counseling
and guidance to assist her in making a decision that may affect her for a lifetime. In fact, the
monetary incentive to sell her child may, depending on her financial circumstances, make her de-
cision less voluntary. Furthermore, the adoptive parents may not be fully informed of the natural
parents' medical history. Baby-selling potentially results in the exploitation of all parties in-
volved." (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)); In re Adoption of Paul, 550 N.Y.S.2d 815, 86
(Fam. Ct. 199o) (warning that a parent selling her child may be motivated by "the promise of fi-
nancial gain" rather than "concern for the best interests of her child").
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that prohibiting the introduction of market transactions into the realm
of parenthood recognizes and protects the specialness of the parent-
child relationship. As a court explained, "[t]here are, in a civilized so-
ciety, some things that money cannot buy. In America, we decided
long ago that merely because conduct purchased by money was 'vol-
untary' did not mean that it was good or beyond regulation and pro-
hibition. '4 9  "There are, in short, values that society deems more im-
portant than granting to wealth whatever it can buy, be it labor, love,
or life."50
Yet while the law of parenthood loudly declares the separation be-
tween the parent-child relation and the market, the law simultaneously
enforces a variety of economic exchanges in this context. The legally
sanctioned economic exchanges tend to take one of two forms. First,
some of these economic exchanges are subject to controls and restric-
tions meant to establish that they are not a means of selling or pur-
chasing a child. Second, some of the sanctioned economic exchanges
are necessary or very useful in a legal regime that wants private indi-
viduals rather than the state to bear the primary responsibility for
children's material needs.
For example, adoptive parents may pay for adoption expenses and
services and for the birth mother's living and medical expenses. As a
practical matter, the line between such legal payments related to adop-
tion and the prohibited purchase of a child may blur. But a multitude
of statutes and judicial decisions carefully specify which forms of
payment are permitted and which prohibited in an effort to mark and
preserve the distinction between paying for an adoption and paying for
a child.s1
49 Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1249.
50 Id.
51 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 273 (West 1999) ("(a) It is a misdemeanor for any person or
agency to pay, offer to pay, or to receive money or anything of value for the placement for adop-
tion or for the consent to an adoption of a child. This subdivision shall not apply to any fee paid
for adoption services provided by the State Department of Social Services, a licensed adoption
agency, adoption services providers,.., or an attorney providing adoption legal services. (b) This
section shall not make it unlawful to pay or receive the maternity-connected medical or hospital
and necessary living expenses of the mother preceding and during confinement as an act of char-
ity, as long as the payment is not contingent upon placement of the child for adoption, consent to
the adoption, or cooperation in the completion of the adoption."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212(I)
(West 2005) ("It is unlawful for any person: ... (c) To sell or surrender, or to arrange for the sale or
surrender of, a minor to another person for money or anything of value or to receive such minor
child for such payment or thing of value. If a minor is being adopted by a relative or by a step-
parent, or is being adopted through an adoption entity, this paragraph does not prohibit the per-
son who is contemplating adopting the child from paying ... the actual prenatal care and living
expenses of the mother of the child to be adopted, or from paying. .. the actual living and medi-
cal expenses of such mother for a reasonable time, not to exceed 6 weeks, if medical needs require
such support, after the birth of the minor."); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 525/4.I(a) (West Supp.
2005) ("A person or persons who have filed or intend to file a petition to adopt a child under the
[Vol. 11I9:491
INTIMACY AND ECONOMIC EXCHANGE
Similarly, many states prohibit recipient parents from paying a sur-
rogate mother for serving as a surrogate and surrendering her rights to
the child.52  However, some states provide that the recipient parents
may transfer money to the surrogate mother in the form of living ex-
penses, medical expenses, and the like.53  These limitations on pay-
Adoption Act shall be permitted to pay the reasonable living expenses of the biological parents of
the child sought to be adopted . . . . 'Reasonable living expenses' means the reasonable costs of
lodging, food, and clothing for the biological parents during the period of the biological mother's
pregnancy and for no more than 30 days after the birth of the child. The term does not include
expenses for lost wages, gifts, educational expenses, or other similar expenses of the biological
parents." (footnote omitted)); Kingsley v. State, 744 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Tex. App. 1987) ("None of
the payments to [the birth mother] were to reimburse her for legal or medical expenses which she
incurred. It is an essential element of the exception provided in section 25.o6(b)(3) that the pay-
ment must be a reimbursement for legal and medical expenses incurred. A review of the record in
this case reveals that some payments to [the birth mother] were for taxi rides, maternity clothes,
gasoline, electricity, rent, groceries, cigarettes, and cosmetics; such items are not 'legal or medical
expenses.' Certainly, it would be incredulous to suggest, for example, that the phrase 'legal or
medical expenses incurred by a person for the benefit of the child' would include payments for
cosmetics or cigarettes for the pregnant mother.").
52 See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-402 (2001) ("(a) Surrogate parenting contracts are prohibited and
rendered unenforceable in the District. (b) Any person or entity who or which is involved in, or
induces, arranges, or otherwise assists in the formation of a surrogate parenting contract for a fee,
compensation, or other remuneration, or otherwise violates this section, shall be subject to a civil
penalty not to exceed $io,ooo or imprisonment for not more than i year, or both."); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 199.590(4) (LexisNexis 1998) ("A person, agency, institution, or intermediary shall
not be a party to a contract or agreement which would compensate a woman for her artificial in-
semination and subsequent termination of parental rights to a child born as a result of that artifi-
cial insemination. A person, agency, institution, or intermediary shall not receive compensation
for the facilitation of contracts or agreements as proscribed by this subsection. Contracts or
agreements entered into in violation of this subsection shall be void."); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:2713 (2005) ("A. A contract for surrogate motherhood as defined herein shall be absolutely
null and shall be void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy. B. 'Contract for surrogate
motherhood' means any agreement whereby a person not married to the contributor of the sperm
agrees for valuable consideration to be inseminated, to carry any resulting fetus to birth, and then
to relinquish to the contributor of the sperm the custody and all rights and obligations to the
child."); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.859 (West 2002) ("(i) A person shall not enter into, in-
duce, arrange, procure, or otherwise assist in the formation of a surrogate parentage contract for
compensation. (2) A participating party.., who knowingly enters into a surrogate parentage con-
tract for compensation is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than
$io,ooo.oo or imprisonment for not more than i year, or both. (3) A person other than a partici-
pating party who induces, arranges, procures, or otherwise assists in the formation of a surrogate
parentage contract for compensation is guilty of a felony punishable by a fine of not more than
$5o,ooo.oo or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both."); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200
(995) ("(i) A surrogate parenthood contract entered into shall be void and unenforceable. The
biological father of a child born pursuant to such a contract shall have all the rights and obliga-
tions imposed by law with respect to such child. (2) For purposes of this section, unless the con-
text otherwise requires, a surrogate parenthood contract shall mean a contract by which a woman
is to be compensated for bearing a child of a man who is not her husband.").
53 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212(l) ("It is unlawful for any person: ... (h) To contract for
the purchase, sale, or transfer of custody or parental rights in connection with any child, in con-
nection with any fetus yet unborn, or in connection with any fetus identified in any way but not
yet conceived, in return for any valuable consideration. Any such contract is void and unenforce-
able as against the public policy of this state. However, fees, costs, and other incidental payments
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ment are intended to establish that surrogacy contracts are not vehicles
for selling a child. Indeed, the states that enforce some surrogacy con-
tracts are focused on differentiating these contracts from child selling.
A number of courts, for instance, articulate various objections to sur-
rogacy contracts,5 4 but announce that the contracts will nonetheless be
made in accordance with statutory provisions for adoption, foster care, and child welfare are
permitted, and a person may agree to pay expenses in connection with a preplanned adoption
agreement as specified below, but the payment of such expenses may not be conditioned upon the
transfer of parental rights."); id. § 742.15(4) ("As part of the contract, the commissioning couple
may agree to pay only reasonable living, legal, medical, psychological, and psychiatric expenses of
the gestational surrogate that are directly related to prenatal, intrapartal, and postpartal peri-
ods.'); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.045(3) (LexisNexis 2004) ("It is unlawful to pay or offer to
pay money or anything of value to the surrogate except for the medical and necessary living ex-
penses related to the birth of the child as specified in the contract."); N.H. REV STAT. ANN.
§ 68-B:2 5 (V) (2002) ("[A surrogacy contract must provide that any] fees shall be limited to: (a)
Pregnancy-related medical expenses, including expenses related to any complications occurring
within 6 weeks after delivery and expenses related to the medical evaluation; (b) Actual lost wages
related to pregnancy, delivery and postpartum recovery, if absence from employment is recom-
mended in writing by the attending physician; (c) Health, disability and life insurance during the
term of pregnancy and 6 weeks thereafter; (d) Reasonable attorney's fees and court costs; and (e)
Counseling fees and costs associated with the nonmedical evaluations, and home studies for the
surrogate and her husband, if any."); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 123(0) (McKinney 1999) ("No person
or other entity shall knowingly request, accept, receive, pay or give any fee, compensation or other
remuneration, directly or indirectly, in connection with any surrogate parenting contract, or in-
duce, arrange or otherwise assist in arranging a surrogate parenting contract for a fee, compensa-
tion or other remuneration, except for: (a) payments in connection with the adoption of a
child... ; or (b) payments for reasonable and actual medical fees and hospital expenses for artifi-
cial insemination or in vitro fertilization services incurred by the mother in connection with the
birth of the child."); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156, 2o-i62(A) (2004) ("'Compensation' means pay-
ment of any valuable consideration for services in excess of reasonable medical and ancillary
costs .... 'Reasonable medical and ancillary costs' means the costs of the performance of assisted
conception, the costs of prenatal maternal health care, the costs of maternal and child health care
for a reasonable post partum period, the reasonable costs for medications and maternity clothes,
and any additional and reasonable costs for housing and other living expenses attributable to the
pregnancy.... A provision in the contract providing for compensation to be paid to the surrogate
is void and unenforceable.'); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.2io(1), 26.26.240 (West 2005)
("'Compensation' means a payment of money, objects, services, or anything else having monetary
value except payment of expenses incurred as a result of the pregnancy and the actual medical
expenses of a surrogate mother, and the payment of reasonable attorney fees for the drafting of a
surrogate parentage contract .... A surrogate parentage contract entered into for compensation,
whether executed in the state of Washington or in another jurisdiction, shall be void and unen-
forceable in the state of Washington as contrary to public policy."); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-22-
803(e) (LexisNexis 2004) ("This section does not prohibit the payment or receipt of the follow-
ing: . . . (3) Fees and expenses included in any agreement in which a woman agrees to become a
surrogate mother.").
54 See, e.g., R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 797 (Mass. 1998) ("Other conditions might be im-
portant in deciding the enforceability of a surrogacy agreement, such as a requirement that (a) the
mother's husband give his informed consent to the agreement in advance; (b) the mother be an
adult and have had at least one successful pregnancy; (c) the mother, her husband, and the in-
tended parents have been evaluated for the soundness of their judgment and for their capacity to
carry out the agreement; (d) the father's wife be incapable of bearing a child without endangering
her health; (e) the intended parents be suitable persons to assume custody of the child; and (f) all
parties have the advice of counsel."); Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1246-47 ("The surrogacy contract
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enforceable if the surrogate mother receives no payment beyond living
and medical expenses and has the opportunity to change her mind
about relinquishing the baby after the baby's birth.55  Sometimes
courts completely invalidate contracts that do not satisfy these crite-
ria.5 6 Sometimes courts hold that they will enforce surrogacy contracts
that provide for additional payment to the surrogate mother, but only
on the condition that the surrogate mother refuses or returns the
payment. 57
guarantees permanent separation of the child from one of its natural parents. Our policy, how-
ever, has long been that to the extent possible, children should remain with and be brought up by
both of their natural parents."); id. at 1247 ("The surrogacy contract violates the policy of this
State that the rights of natural parents are equal concerning their child, the father's right no
greater than the mother's."); id. ("[Tihere is no counseling, independent or otherwise, of the natu-
ral mother, no evaluation, no warning."); id. at 1248 ("[T]he natural father and adoptive
mother.., know little about the natural mother, her genetic makeup, and her psychological and
medical history. Moreover, not even a superficial attempt is made to determine their awareness of
their responsibilities as parents."); id. ("Worst of all, however, is the contract's total disregard of
the best interests of the child.").
55 See R.R., 689 N.E.2d at 797 ("We recognize that there is nothing inherently unlawful in an
arrangement by which an informed woman agrees to attempt to conceive artificially and give
birth to a child whose father would be the husband of an infertile wife. We suspect that many
such arrangements are made and carried out without disagreement. If no compensation is paid
beyond pregnancy-related expenses and if the mother is not bound by her consent to the father's
custody of the child unless she consents after a suitable period has passed following the child's
birth, the objections we have identified in this opinion to the enforceability of a surrogate's con-
sent to custody would be overcome.'); Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1235 ("We find no offense to our pre-
sent laws where a woman voluntarily and without payment agrees to act as a 'surrogate' mother,
provided that she is not subject to a binding agreement to surrender her child."); id. at 1240 ("Our
law prohibits paying or accepting money in connection with any placement of a child for adop-
tion. N.J.S.A. 9:3-54a. Violation is a high misdemeanor. N.J.S.A. 9:3-54c. Excepted are fees of
an approved agency (which must be a nonprofit entity, N.J.S.A. 9:3-38a) and certain expenses in
connection with childbirth. N.J.S.A. 9 :3 -5 4 b.").
56 See R.R., 689 N.E.2d at 796 ("The statutory prohibition of payment for receiving a child
through adoption suggests that, as a matter of policy, a mother's agreement to surrender custody
in exchange for money (beyond pregnancy-related expenses) should be given no effect in deciding
the custody of the child."); Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1234 ("We invalidate the surrogacy contract be-
cause it conflicts with the law and public policy of this State .... [W]e void both the termination
of the surrogate mother's parental rights and the adoption of the child by the wife/stepparent. We
thus restore the 'surrogate' as the mother of the child.").
57 See In re Adoption of Paul, 550 N.Y.S.2d 815, 818-i9 (Fam. Ct. 199o) ("Accordingly, only if
Elizabeth will swear under oath before this Court that she has not and will not request, accept or
receive the $io,ooo promised to her in exchange for surrender of her child, can this Court accept
such surrender and terminate her parental rights. Only if she is free of the intimidation inherent
in her contractual commitment to give up her child and the inducement of a $1o,ooo gain, can
Elizabeth's surrender of her parental rights be truly voluntary and motivated exclusively by
Paul's best interests. Should Elizabeth sincerely believe that her son's best interests alone require
such surrender, without the inducement of financial reward to her, an affidavit to that effect, duly
sworn and executed, should be submitted to this Court so that a date may be scheduled for her
appearance. In addition,... the proposed adoptive parents must also provide sworn affidavits
evidencing their intent not to pay or give any compensation or thing of value to any party in ex-
change for the child.").
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In addition to sanctioning economic exchanges limited in ways de-
signed to establish that they are not a means of selling or purchasing a
child, the law of parenthood enforces other economic exchanges that
are either essential or highly useful to a legal order that seeks to place
the primary responsibility for children's material needs on individual
parents instead of the state. Parents, for instance, have a legal obliga-
tion to support their children financially until the age of majority, and
a person may be stripped of his legal status as a parent if he fails
without cause to provide financial support to his child.5 8  When par-
ents are unavailable to care for their children, they may and sometimes
(to avoid child neglect) must hire child care workers to perform that
work. Parents may recoup some of their financial investment in their
children by employing them, and parent-employers are exempt from
many federal and state laws limiting child labor.59
58 See In re R.H.N., 710 P.2d 482, 486 (Colo. 1985) (en banc) ("Once a court has determined in
the context of a stepparent adoption proceeding that termination and adoption would be in the
best interests of the child, the court must then consider whether ... the child is 'available for
adoption' because the natural parent failed to provide reasonable support without cause."); In re
Adoption of B.L.P., 728 P.2d 803, 805 (Mont. 1986) ("A parent cannot voluntarily become unem-
ployed, fail to pay court ordered child support, and retain parental rights."); Holodook v. Spencer,
324 N.E.2d 338, 342 (N.Y. i974) ("Of the many duties arising from the parent-child relation, only
very few give rise to legal consequences for their breach. Parents are obligated in accordance
with their means to support and maintain their children - i. e., to furnish adequate food, cloth-
ing, shelter, medical attention and education. A parent's failure to observe minimum standards of
care in performing these duties entails both remedial sanctions, such as the forfeiture of custody,
and criminal sanctions."); In re Adoption of Lay, 495 N.E.2d 9, io (Ohio 1986) (per curiam) ("[A]
total absence of court-ordered support payments for the statutorily mandated one-year period,
which we undisputedly have in the case sub judice, certainly satisfies the requirements set forth in
R.C. 3107.07 for adoption without consent if such nonpayment occurred without justifiable
cause."); In re Adoption of Blevins, 695 P.2d 556, 56o (Okla. Ct. App. 1984) ("Since the states may
be sustained in enforcing financial support obligations of parents with respect to their children,
the question is whether § 6o.6(3) finds a correct balance in its provision permitting adoption with-
out consent of a parent who has been found to wilfully fail, refuse or neglect to contribute to the
support as ordered by the court. We think it does.").
59 A child working for his parent on the parent's farm is not protected by federal minimum
wage and maximum hour requirements, see 29 U.S.C. § 2 13(a)(6)(B) (2ooo), by the federal ban on
child labor before the age of twelve, see id. § 2 13(c)(i)(A), or by the federal prohibition on employ-
ing children under sixteen in "particularly hazardous" occupations, id. § 213(c)(2); see also ARK.
CODE ANN. § 11-6-104 (2002) ("No child under the age of fourteen (14) years shall be employed
or permitted to work in any remunerative occupation in this state, except that during school vaca-
tion, children under fourteen (i4) years may be employed by their parents or guardians in occupa-
tions owned or controlled by them."); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1394(a) (West 2003) ("[Nothing in this
article shall prohibit or prevent t]he employment of any minor at agricultural, horticultural, viti-
cultural, or domestic labor during the time the public schools are not in session, or during other
than school hours, when the work performed is for or under the control of his parent or guardian
and is performed upon or in connection with premises owned, operated or controlled by the par-
ent or guardian. However, nothing herein shall permit children under schoolage to work at these
occupations, while the public schools are in session."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 6o-12-3 (2004)
("No child under sixteen years of age may be employed at any time in any occupation dangerous
to life, health, or morals, nor may any child be in any manner exploited by any employer.... This
section does not apply to minors employed by their parents .... ").
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The law of parenthood, like the law governing marriage and non-
marital sexual relationships, is intent on distinguishing intimate rela-
tionships and certain that one of the most effective strategies for ac-
complishing this differentiation is to contend that the intimate
relationship is far removed from the world of economics. Here, too,
the law draws attention to its refusal to enforce certain economic ex-
changes, while simultaneously sanctioning other economic exchanges
to secure the material needs of intimates. Indeed, as we have ob-
served, the law assumes with predictable regularity that one of the
crucial ways to establish and uphold the unique worth and dignity of
an intimate relationship is to proclaim the relationship's separation
from the market and to prohibit some forms of economic exchange be-
tween intimates.
IV. THE DISTRIBUTIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE LEGAL
REGULATION OF ECONOMIC EXCHANGE BETWEEN INTIMATES
AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR REFORM
A. The Law's Distributive Consequences
The law regulating economic exchange between intimates seeks to
protect something of tremendous importance when it insists upon
maintaining distinctions between relationships. Differentiation is a le-
gitimate and highly valuable role for the law to perform. As we have
seen, there is an enormous societal interest in recognizing what is dif-
ferent and special about intimate relationships as compared to other
relationships.
Yet legal means of differentiation that are appropriate in some cir-
cumstances and situations may be inappropriate elsewhere. In par-
ticular, the law's attempts to advance expressive interests through the
regulation of economic exchange between intimates should be reexam-
ined and reformed when this regulation perpetuates persistent status
inequality or distributive injustice.
At the moment, legal efforts to mark the specialness of intimate re-
lationships by limiting or prohibiting economic exchange within them
appear to have systematically adverse distributional consequences for
women and poorer people, maintaining and increasing distributive
inequality. One likely reason seems to be the background assumptions
that legal efforts to protect intimacy make about the nature of intimate
relationships. When regulating an intimate relationship, the law can
presume that the relationship is between equals. From this perspec-
tive, when one intimate transfers money, property, or services to an-
other intimate, the starting premise about that transfer should be that
it is compensation for equally valuable money, property, or services
that the other intimate has provided or will provide, either in a dis-
crete transaction or over the course of a relationship. Alternatively,
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the law can presume in regulating an intimate relationship that the re-
lationship is asymmetrical, with one intimate a provider and the other
a dependent. From this perspective, any money, property, or services
that the provider transfers to the dependent are transferred because of
the provider's altruism and the dependent's need, and any money,
property, or services the dependent supplies are less valuable than
what the dependent receives.
The law frequently presumes dependency in regulating economic
exchange between even adult intimates. More specifically, the law's
strategies for affirming the distinctiveness of intimacy appear to stead-
ily assume that women - including relatively poor women - need
not be compensated for their activities. On this view, women can be
deprived of a direct claim to economic assets based on their own ac-
tivities because they will be supported by other people. In the process,
the law helps produce the situation it purports only to describe, mak-
ing self-support more difficult and enhancing the need to rely on
others.
For instance, the law's refusal to enforce interspousal contracts for
domestic services is meant to promote the dignity and distinctiveness
of the marital relation by declaring its separation from the market. 60
Originally, this refusal to enforce interspousal contracts for domestic
services was sex-specific. Judges in the nineteenth century were intent
on maintaining a system of common law coverture that insisted upon
and ensured a wife's subordination and dependency in marriage.6 1 To
this end, judges enforced a husband's ownership of his wife's domestic
labor and kept him free from any obligation to compensate his wife for
her labor.62 The modern refusal to enforce interspousal contracts for
domestic services is facially sex-neutral. 63  Yet all the available evi-
dence indicates that women still perform significantly disproportionate
60 See supra text accompanying notes 13-18.
61 William Blackstone's definition of coverture was by far the most influential. He explained:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or
legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorpo-
rated and consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and
cover, she performs every thing .... Upon this principle, of an union of person in hus-
band and wife, depend almost all the legal rights, duties, and disabilities, that either of
them acquire by the marriage.
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, i COMMENTARIES *430. For modern discussions of common law
coverture, see ELIZABETH BOWLES WARBASSE, THE CHANGING LEGAL RIGHTS OF
MARRIED WOMEN, I8oo-i86i, at 5-24 (1987), and Hasday, supra note 5, at 1389-92.
62 See Siegel, supra note 13, at 2168-96.
63 See supra text accompanying notes 13-18.
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amounts of domestic labor within marriage. 64  The legal doctrine de-
nying enforcement to interspousal contracts for domestic labor dispro-
portionately deprives women of the right to receive compensation for
their labor. Of course, some women may receive more in the marital
support their husbands choose to provide than they would receive if
they had a legal right to be paid for their domestic work. But other
women might be better off economically if they had a right to negoti-
ate payment for household labor. The refusal to enforce interspousal
contracts for domestic services, moreover, ensures that more wives re-
ceive their economic assets in the form of provided support (social ex-
change) rather than legally negotiated compensation (legal exchange)
and in this way helps perpetuate married women's dependence on
their husbands. The refusal to enforce interspousal contracts for do-
mestic services still assumes and helps entrench a marital structure in
which wives, including wives who work only in the home, can be de-
nied a right to compensation for their domestic labor because they are
supposed to be supported rather than earn their own support.
The legal regulation of economic exchanges related to parenthood,
in turn, appears to disproportionately injure poorer people, especially
poorer women. Many states, for example, prohibit or restrict surrogate
mothers from receiving payment.65  These bans or limitations on pay-
ment are intended to establish that surrogacy contracts are not a form
of child selling, and in this way to uphold the worth and dignity of the
parent-child relation. But the available evidence suggests that surro-
64 See, e.g., SARAH FENSTERMAKER BERK, THE GENDER FACTORY: THE APPORTION-
MENT OF WORK IN AMERICAN HOUSEHOLDS 7 (1985) ("[T]he total time spent by married
women on household labor is substantial and remains so regardless of most household or bio-
graphical characteristics. Contemporary aggregate time estimates range from approximately 30 to
6o hours per week for wives' contributions to household labor. These estimates mean that, on the
average, wives contribute about 70% of the total time that all members spend on household
work."); BETH ANNE SHELTON, WOMEN, MEN AND TIME: GENDER DIFFERENCES IN PAID
WORK, HOUSEWORK AND LEISURE 66-67 (1992) ("Married men spend only 52.5% as much
time on household labor as married women .... [A]mong married respondents, men do over
twenty fewer hours of household labor in a week than women."); Suzanne M. Bianchi et al., Is
Anyone Doing the Housework?: Trends in the Gender Division of Household Labor, 79 SOC.
FORCES 191, 198 (2000) ("The proportion of [house]work that husbands are reported to have
done in recent years ranges from about 25% to 40%, depending on measurement criterion and the
range of tasks defined as housework." (citations omitted)); Scott Coltrane, Research on Household
Labor: Modeling and Measuring the Social Embeddedness of Routine Family Work, 62 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 12o8, 1212 (2000) ("[Wlives spend two or three times as many hours on
housework as their husbands." (citations omitted)).
65 See supra text accompanying notes 52-57.
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gate mothers typically occupy a relatively low socioeconomic status. 66
66 See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND
SOCIAL CHOICES 268 (I988) ("Preliminary psychological and demographic studies ... as well as
surrogate matching service reports to OTA demonstrate that women who have volunteered to be
surrogates are distinctly less well educated and less well off than those who hire them .... ).
Compare id. at 269-70 ("Those seeking to hire a surrogate mother are generally well off and well
educated. Overall, agencies reported that approximately 64 percent of their clients have a house-
hold income over $50,000, with an additional 28 percent earning $30,000 to $50,000 per year.
One-third of the services reported that at least half of their clients have been to graduate school,
and another third reported that at least 8o percent of their clients have been to graduate school.
Overall, the services reported that at least 37 percent of their clients are college-educated, and
another 54 percent have attended graduate school."), and HELENA RAGON9, SURROGATE
MOTHERHOOD: CONCEPTION IN THE HEART 89, 91 (I994) ("[T]he couples as a group are up-
per-middle-income, educated professionals, in their late thirties and early forties .... [A]I of the
couples in my sample are Caucasian, as are the majority of couples who choose surrogacy. Of the
nine adoptive mothers for whom financial data were available, three, or 33 percent, earned less
than $30,000 and six, or 67 percent, earned more than $30,000 per year. Six of the eight inter-
viewed husbands (75 percent) and seven out of twelve husbands for whom financial data were
available (58 percent) earned $75,000 a year or more. The average combined family income is in
excess of $ioo,ooo."), with OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra, at 273 ("OTA asked surro-
gate matching agencies to describe some of the characteristics of the women who had passed
through their screening procedures and were waiting to be hired as surrogate mothers.... Over-
all, agencies reported that fewer than 35 percent of the women had ever attended college, and
only 4 percent had attended any graduate school. Agencies draw the bulk of the surrogates from
the population earning $I5,oo to $30,000 per year (approximately 53 percent), with 30 percent
earning $30,000 to $5o,ooo per year, and at most 5 percent earning more than $50,000. Six agen-
cies reported no women earning less than $15,ooo per year who were currently waiting to be hired
as surrogates, partly due to the fact that some agencies will not accept surrogates who are on wel-
fare or who are not 'financially independent.' Overall, agencies reported that approximately 3
percent of the women had household incomes of less than $I5,ooo per year."), RAGON9, supra, at
6, 54-55 ("The quantifiable data collected from [twenty-eight] formal surrogate interviews reveal
that surrogates are predominantly white, working class, of Protestant or Catholic background;
approximately 30 percent are full-time homemakers, married, with an average of three children,
high school graduates, with an average age of twenty-seven years .... Surrogates who are em-
ployed outside the home tend to work in the service sector. The average family income of married
surrogates is $38,700. Unmarried surrogates' income level ranges from $16,ooo to $24,000."),
David MacPhee & Kathy Forest, Surrogacy: Programme Comparisons and Policy Implications, 4
INT'L J.L. & FAM. 308, 311 (i99o) ("Sixty women who had contracted to be surrogate mothers
were contacted through two different programmes. Of those who completed the study (7 per cent
of the total US surrogate population), 29 were from a surrogacy programme in Michigan (66 per
cent return) and i2 were from a programme in California (75 per cent return) .... On average,
these women ... had at least a high-school education (M = 13.3 yrs.), [and] lived in a household
where one or both adults were clerical or blue-collar workers . . . ."), Philip J. Parker, Motivation
of Surrogate Mothers: Initial Findings, 14o AM. J. PSYCHIATRY l17, 117 (I983) ("I have inter-
viewed more than 225 white women applying for surrogate motherhood .... Of the first 5o ap-
plicants, slightly more than 20 (40%) were unemployed at the time of the interviews or were re-
ceiving some form of financial aid or both. Almost 6o% (N=3o) of the applicants were working or
had a working spouse; each family's total income ranged from $6,ooo to $55,ooo (actual i98o or
projected i98i figures). The applicants' formal education ranged from less than high school to a
bachelor's degree: of the first 5o applicants, 9 (18%) had not completed high school, 27 (54%) had
either graduated from high school or had received a General Equivalency Diploma, 13 (26%) had
taken some college courses after high school or had attended business school or nursing school (2
were licensed practical nurses, and i was a registered nurse), and i had a bachelor's degree."), and
Nancy E. Reame & Philip J. Parker, Surrogate Pregnancy: Clinical Features of Forty-Four Cases,
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The legal prohibitions and restrictions on payment to surrogate moth-
ers deny compensation to the person who is likely to be the poorest
party to the surrogate motherhood arrangement, sometimes after the
surrogate has already fulfilled her part of the agreement. The history
of the legal regulation of surrogacy is much shorter than the history of
the legal regulation of marriage. The law has had less time to develop
background assumptions about how surrogate mothers and recipient
parents - intimately connected by virtue of their status as present or
future parents of the same children - are supposed to interact. Yet
here again, the law refuses women compensation for activities that can
be taxing and time-consuming. The payment for living and medical
expenses that states permit surrogate mothers to accept from recipient
parents is meant to respond to surrogate mothers' most basic needs,
not to serve as a form of compensation. The law seems to presume in
denying women compensation for their own efforts that the women
will receive support from somewhere else, and in the process increases
women's need for such support.
States also carefully restrict the payments that adoptive parents
may make to birth mothers. 67 These restrictions, too, are meant to
protect the specialness of the parent-child relation. This goal is un-
doubtedly important, yet it bears noting that the existing evidence sug-
gests that women placing their children for adoption tend to be disad-
vantaged compared to the rest of the population. 68 In this context as
162 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1220, 1220-22 (I990) ("This report describes the ob-
stetric characteristics of 44 pregnancies occurring in 41 women who participated in a private, at-
torney-affiliated surrogate parenting program and delivered of infants between November I98I
and June I985 .... The average level of education for this sample was 12.3 ± 2 years. Twelve of
the 41 women (29%) were welfare recipients or reported no source of income at the time of in-
semination (two women were full-time students). For the remaining 29 subjects, the mean annual
income was $,5,709 (range $1o,ooo to $35,000; median $12,ooo) .... Although the sample size is
small by traditional standards, it represents approximately io% of the estimated national popula-
tion of surrogate mothers at the time of the study.... The most common annual income category
reported by the subjects was <$Io,OOO (46%), which is comparable to the national poverty level
for a family of four in 1983.").
67 See supra text accompanying note 5 i.
68 For instance, one study of 146 adolescent women who surrendered their children for adop-
tion after they "attended a pregnancy-counseling program affiliated with a large adoption agency
that practices open adoption" found that these women were "disadvantaged when compared with
the general population or with a population of never-pregnant teenagers." Steven D. McLaughlin
et al., Do Adolescents Who Relinquish Their Children Fare Better or Worse than Those Who
Raise Them?, 2o FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 25, 25 (1988). As the study concluded, "[a]dolescents who
place their children for adoption continue to live with the disadvantages associated with the indi-
vidual and socioeconomic factors that initially brought them to the adolescent mother status." Id.
at 32. Another study analyzed "three hundred sample respondents ... selected randomly from the
records of the Department of Social Services in an eastern province of Canada." PAUL SACHDEV
UNLOCKING THE ADOPTION FILES 21 (1989). It found that the seventy-eight birth mothers in
this sample "were not highly educated" and "by and large belonged to low- to middle-income
status." Id. at 23, 50-5 i. "More than go percent had not gone beyond high school and a year in a
2005]
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
well, more vulnerable people are shouldering the weight of the law's
desire to recognize the worth of an intimate relation, and women are
assumed and directed to get their support elsewhere.
B. Differentiating Intimate Relationships
Without Relying on Economic Restraints
The law's urge to signify the dignity and distinctiveness of intimate
relationships should be affirmed. But the apparent distributional con-
sequences of the law's current efforts at differentiation suggest a need
to reexamine how the legal system establishes the specialness of an in-
timate relationship, in ways that will assist the people who now seem
to be further disadvantaged and deprived by legal acts of social sancti-
fication. At the least, the law should be more conscious of and con-
cerned about the cumulative distributive effects of its attempts to pro-
tect expressive values. It should search for alternative means of
differentiating relationships that advance the same expressive ends
with less distributional cost. When the law marks the specialness of
intimate relations, it should try to avoid further entrenching inequali-
ties of bargaining and resource power.
One possibility to explore is how the law might affirm the special-
ness of intimate relationships in ways that do not involve restrictions
on economic exchange. After all, it is unlikely that the only way to
promote the distinctiveness of intimate relationships is to insist upon
the distance between intimacy and economics, especially because inti-
mate relations are inevitably entangled in economic exchange.
In this regard, it might help to consider how the law marks the
specialness of other relationships. There are relationships outside of
marriage, nonmarital sexual relationships, and parenthood in which
people are closely connected to one another, highly reliant on one an-
other, sometimes in great need, bound to reveal private information,
and often unevenly situated in their knowledge and bargaining power.
Those characteristics describe, for instance, the relationship between a
lawyer and client or a doctor and patient. These are relationships of
enormous consequence. Yet the law places relatively few impediments
on economic exchange within them. Instead, the legal system adopts a
variety of other mechanisms to mark and uphold the importance and
distinctiveness of the lawyer-client and doctor-patient relationships.
For instance, the law establishes that lawyers have a fiduciary duty
to their clients, and doctors have a fiduciary duty to their patients.
This duty legally obligates lawyers to act in their clients' interests and
trade college .... Consistent with their low level of schooling, more than half of all birth mothers
were currently or once employed as skilled or unskilled workers and one-third as sales or clerical
workers." Id. at 5o-5 i.
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doctors to act in their patients' interests. 69 For example, except in
compelling circumstances, lawyers must keep their clients' confi-
dences,70 and doctors must not disclose their patients' personal infor-
mation.7" Courts explain that the law requiring lawyers and doctors to
69 See, e.g., Clancy v. State Bar, 454 P.2d 329, 333 (Cal. 1969) (in bank) (per curiam) ("The rela-
tionship between an attorney and client is a fiduciary relationship of the very highest character.
All dealings between an attorney and his client that are beneficial to the attorney will be closely
scrutinized with the utmost strictness for any unfairness."); Petrillo v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 499
N.E.2d 952, 961 (Il. App. Ct. 1986) ("The existence of this fiduciary relationship indicates
that... [t]here is an implied promise, arising when the physician begins treating the patient, that
the physician will refrain from engaging in conduct that is inconsistent with the 'good faith' re-
quired of a fiduciary. The patient should, we believe, be able to trust that the physician will act
in the best interests of the patient thereby protecting the sanctity of the physician-patient relation-
ship."); City of Hastings v. Jerry Spady Pontiac-Cadillac, Inc., 322 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Neb. 1982)
("It is fundamental law that an attorney must not while representing a client do anything know-
ingly that is inconsistent with the terms of his employment or contrary to the best interests of his
client."); In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d io69, 1071 (N.Y. 1994) ("The duty to deal fairly, honestly
and with undivided loyalty superimposes onto the attorney-client relationship a set of special and
unique duties, including maintaining confidentiality, avoiding conflicts of interest, operating com-
petently, safeguarding client property and honoring the clients' interests over the lawyer's." (cita-
tions omitted)).
70 See Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan's Rests., Inc., 590 F.2d 168, 171-72 (5th Cir. 1979) (enforcing
"an attorney's duty to 'preserve the confidences and secrets of a client"' (quoting ABA CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1970))); People v. Lopez, 845 P.2d 1153, 1155 (Colo. 1993) (en
banc) (per curiam) ("[A] lawyer may reveal the confidences or secrets of the lawyer's client only
after full disclosure to and with the consent of the client."); In re Holley, 729 N.Y.S.2d 128, 132-33
(App. Div. 2ooi) (per curiam) ("[R]espondent's failure to take adequate precautions to safeguard
confidential materials of a client, even if considered unintentional, was careless conduct that re-
flects adversely on his fitness to practice law. ... Under all the facts and circumstances, a sanction
of public censure is fully warranted." (citation omitted)).
71 See Horne v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824, 829-30 (Ala. 1973) ("[A] medical doctor is under a gen-
eral duty not to make extra-judicial disclosures of information acquired in the course of the doc-
tor-patient relationship and ... a breach of that duty will give rise to a cause of action. It is, of
course, recognized that this duty is subject to exceptions prompted by the supervening interests of
society, as well as the private interests of the patient himself."); MacDonald v. Clinger, 446
N.Y.S.2d 8oi, 805 (App. Div. 1982) ("The relationship of the parties here was one of trust and con-
fidence out of which sprang a duty not to disclose. Defendant's breach was not merely a broken
contractual promise but a violation of a fiduciary responsibility to plaintiff implicit in and essen-
tial to the doctor-patient relation. Such ... breach is actionable ... if it is wrongful, that is to say,
without justification or excuse."); McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431, 435, 437 (S.C. Ct. App.
1997) ("A majority of the jurisdictions faced with the issue have recognized a cause of action
against a physician for the unauthorized disclosure of confidential information unless the disclo-
sure is compelled by law or is in the patient's interest or the public interest .... We find the rea-
soning of the cases from other jurisdictions persuasive on this issue and today we join the major-
ity and hold that an actionable tort lies for a physician's breach of the duty to maintain the
confidences of his or her patient in the absence of a compelling public interest or other justifica-
tion for the disclosure." (footnote omitted)); Fairfax Hosp. v. Curtis, 492 S.E.2d 642, 645 (Va.
1997) ("We hold that in the absence of a statutory command to the contrary, or absent a serious
danger to the patient or others, a health care provider owes a duty to the patient not to disclose
information gained from the patient during the course of treatment without the patient's authori-
zation, and that violation of this duty gives rise to an action in tort. We observe that our holding
today is consistent with decisions of most jurisdictions which have considered this issue.").
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act as fiduciaries protects and upholds "the sanctity"72 and "special"7 3
nature of the lawyer-client and doctor-patient relationships by requir-
ing lawyers and doctors to act with special regard for their clients and
patients - regard that an ordinary service provider would not have to
extend to an ordinary customer in a "commonplace commercial" trans-
action "in the commercial market place. '7 4 As they note, the relation
between lawyer and client or doctor and patient is distinctive, one of
great "trust,715 "confidence, '7 6 and "reliance.
'77
The law similarly imposes stringent requirements on lawyers and
doctors to secure the informed consent of their clients and patients.
Lawyers and doctors are frequently obligated to convey to their clients
and patients material information about risks, circumstances, and al-
ternatives so that the clients and patients can make informed judg-
ments about which courses of action to pursue. 78 Here, too, courts ex-
plain that the requirement to secure informed consent recognizes the
72 PetriUo, 499 N.E.2d at 961.
73 Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d at 1072.
74 Id. at 1071-72; see also Petrillo, 499 N.E.2d at 96i ("The existence of this fiduciary relation-
ship indicates that there is more between a patient and his physician than a mere contract under
which the physician promises to heal and the patient promises to pay.").
75 Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy v. Boon, 13 F.3 d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1994); Brennan's,
Inc., 590 F.2d at 172; Petrillo, 499 N.E.2d at 961; Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d at 1o71; McCormick,
494 S.E.2d at 435.
76 Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, 13 F.3d at 543; Petrillo, 499 N.E.2d at 961; Cooperman,
633 N.E.2d at 1071-72.
77 Brennan's, Inc., 590 F.2d at 172.
78 See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P2d 479, 483 (Cal. 199o) (in bank) ("First, 'a
person of adult years and in sound mind has the right, in the exercise of control over his own
body, to determine whether or not to submit to lawful medical treatment.' Second, 'the patient's
consent to treatment, to be effective, must be an informed consent.' Third, in soliciting the pa-
tient's consent, a physician has a fiduciary duty to disclose all information material to the pa-
tient's decision." (citations omitted) (quoting Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P2d i, 9 (Cal. 1972) (in bank)));
Kinikin v. Heupel, 305 N.W.2d 589, 595 (Minn. 198i) ("A physician must disclose risks of death or
serious bodily harm which are of significant probability; to this there is no contention. Risks
which a skilled practitioner of good standing in the community would reveal must also be dis-
closed .... Lastly, to the extent a doctor is or can be aware that his patient attaches particular
significance to risks not generally considered by the medical profession serious enough to require
discussion with the patient, these too must be brought out."); Greene v. Greene, 436 N.E.2d 496,
499 (N.Y. 1982) ("The basic rule ... is that 'an attorney who seeks to avail himself of a contract
made with his client, is bound to establish affirmatively that it was made by the client with full
knowledge of all the material circumstances known to the attorney, and was in every respect free
from fraud on his part, or misconception on the part of the client, and that a reasonable use was
made by the attorney of the confidence reposed in him."' (quoting Whitehead v. Kennedy, 69
N.Y. 462, 466 (1877))); Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 501 (Wis. 1996) ("In order to insure
that a patient can give an informed consent, a 'physician or surgeon is under the duty to provide
the patient with such information as may be necessary under the circumstances then existing' to
assess the significant potential risks which the patient confronts. The information that must be
disclosed is that information which would be 'material' to a patient's decision." (citation omitted)
(quoting Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 647, 652 (Wis. 1975); Martin v.
Richards, 531 N.W.2d 70, 78 (Wis. 199))).
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special nature of the relationship between lawyer and client or doctor
and patient, in which the client or patient is likely to rely heavily on
the professional's expertise and judgment, and to have less independ-
ent access to the information needed to make informed decisions.7 9
In contrast, the laws governing both the lawyer-client and the doc-
tor-patient relationships place relatively few restraints on economic ex-
change. The restraints that do exist, moreover, tend to be forms of the
standard legal protections for market transactions, such as restraints
on theft,8 0 fraud,8 ' and unconscionability (strictly defined)., 2 To an ex-
tent that is striking when compared to the law regulating familial in-
timates, the law governing professional relationships does not attempt
to establish the specialness and importance of these relationships by
declaring their separation from the market and loudly prohibiting cer-
tain forms of economic exchange within them. Instead, the legal sys-
79 See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("T ue consent to what hap-
pens to one's self is the informed exercise of a choice, and that entails an opportunity to evaluate
knowledgeably the options available and the risks attendant upon each. The average patient has
little or no understanding of the medical arts, and ordinarily has only his physician to whom he
can look for enlightenment with which to reach an intelligent decision. From these almost axio-
matic considerations springs the need, and in turn the requirement, of a reasonable divulgence by
physician to patient to make such a decision possible." (footnotes omitted)); id. at 782 ("The pa-
tient's reliance upon the physician is a trust of the kind which traditionally has exacted obliga-
tions beyond those associated with arms-length transactions. His dependence upon the physician
for information affecting his well-being, in terms of contemplated treatment, is well-nigh abject."
(footnote omitted)); Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 9 ("[P]atients are generally persons unlearned in the medical
sciences and therefore, except in rare cases, courts may safely assume the knowledge of patient
and physician are not in parity.... [Tihe patient, being unlearned in medical sciences, has an ab-
ject dependence upon and trust in his physician for the information upon which he relies during
the decisional process, thus raising an obligation in the physician that transcends arms-length
transactions.").
80 See In re Cleland, 2 P.3d 700, 703 (Colo. 2000) (en banc) (per curiam) ("As we have said nu-
merous times before, disbarment is the presumed sanction when a lawyer knowingly misappro-
priates funds belonging to a client or a third person."); In re Schoepfer, 687 N.E.2d 391, 393
(Mass. 1997) ("[T]his court has generally stated that disbarment or indefinite suspension is the
presumptive sanction if a lawyer has intentionally deprived a client of funds."); In re Barlow, 657
A.2d 1197, 1199 (N.J. 1995) (per curiam) ("We have consistently held that 'disbarment is the only
appropriate discipline [for knowing misappropriation of client funds]."' (alteration in original)
(quoting In re Wilson, 409 A.2d 1153, 1154 (N.J. 1979))); In re Pierson, 57, P2d 907, 909 (Or.
1977) (in banc) (per curiam) ("We hold that a single conversion by a lawyer to his own use of his
client's funds will result in permanent disbarment.").
81 See Jackson v. Julian, 694 S.W.2d 434, 436 (Tex. App. 1985) ("To state a cause of action for
actual fraud, the patient must allege that the doctor knowingly or recklessly made a false repre-
sentation of a material fact with the intention that the patient would act thereon, and that she
acted in reliance on the misrepresentation to her injury." (emphasis omitted)).
82 See Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison v. Telex Corp., 602 F.2d 866, 875 (9th Cir. 1979) (per cu-
riam) ("In these circumstances, the contract between [client] and [lawyer] was not so unconscion-
able that 'no man in his senses and not under a delusion would make on the one hand, and as no
honest and fair man would accept on the other."' (quoting Swanson v. Hempstead, 149 P.2d 404,
407 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944))).
2005]
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
tem permits money to flow through these relationships and uses other
means to mark their distinctiveness.
With this in mind, we can explore how the law might employ these
alternate strategies to establish and protect the specialness of relation-
ships between familial intimates. Consider how such alternate strate-
gies might work in two specific contexts: surrogacy and adoption.
At the moment, the law governing surrogate motherhood attempts
to recognize and protect the specialness of the parent-child relation by
emphasizing restrictions and prohibitions on the payment that a surro-
gate mother may receive. 83 The law regulating professional relation-
ships, however, suggests a number of other ways that the law might
structure surrogacy arrangements to mark the distinctiveness and dig-
nity of the parent-child relation. For instance, this body of law sug-
gests the importance of securing the surrogate mother's informed con-
sent. To some degree, the law already reflects this concern. As we
have seen, a number of courts refuse to enforce surrogacy contracts
unless the surrogate mother receives no more than medical and living
expenses and has the right to change her mind about surrendering the
child after the child's birth.8 4 The latter requirement represents some
effort toward establishing informed consent, on the theory that a sur-
rogate mother will have more information about what surrender en-
tails once the baby is born. But the law might go much further to-
ward ensuring that a surrogate mother's consent is informed. For
example, the law might hold that surrogacy contracts will be unen-
forceable unless the surrogate mother is informed about the potential
dangers and risks associated with surrogacy. The law might also pro-
vide that surrogacy contracts will be unenforceable unless the surro-
gate mother is represented by her own legal counsel or otherwise in-
formed of her legal rights. The law might require recipient parents to
pay for the surrogate's legal counsel. In the process, the law could
recognize and respect the specialness of the parent-child relation in
ways that could also protect the surrogate mother rather than simply
requiring her to forgo compensation.
Similarly, the law on professional relationships suggests that the
law governing surrogacy could help safeguard the specialness of the
parent-child relation by imposing a duty on both surrogate mothers
and recipient parents to act as fiduciaries for each other and for the
potential child. This duty could mean, for example, that both surro-
gate mothers and recipient parents would be legally obligated to con-
vey all relevant information to each other. For instance, the law might
require both surrogate mothers and recipient parents to reveal any
83 See supra text accompanying notes 52-57.
84 See supra text accompanying note 55.
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prior experience they have had with surrogacy, pregnancy, or child
rearing. It might require both surrogate mothers and biological fathers
to reveal whether they have any serious biological impairments that a
child might inherit. It might require recipient parents to reveal any
reason they might be unfit parents and to undergo an examination to
ensure that they have the means and ability to care for a child. All of
these potential legal requirements would recognize and protect the
specialness of the parent-child relation, while distributing the burdens
the requirements impose more evenly between surrogate mothers and
recipient parents.
The law on adoption might be reformed along analogous lines. For
example, this body of law might also place a renewed emphasis on se-
curing the birth mother's informed consent. States frequently provide
that an adoption cannot become legally binding until a certain amount
of time has passed after the child's birth or after the birth mother has
initially relinquished the child for adoption.8 One purpose of these
delays in making an adoption permanent is to increase the information
that the birth mother has available in forming a final decision to place
a child for adoption, on the premise that the birth mother will know
more about the ramifications of an adoptive placement once the child
has been born and the birth mother has initially surrendered custody.
But the law might do more to ensure that a birth mother's consent to
adoption is informed consent. For example, states might provide free
legal counsel to birth mothers placing their children for adoption
85 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-ioA-13(a) (1992) ("A consent or relinquishment may be taken at
any time, except that once signed or confirmed, may be withdrawn within five days after birth or
within five days after signing of the consent or relinquishment, whichever comes last."); CAL.
FAM. CODE § 88oi. 3 (b)(2) (West Supp. 2004) ("The [adoption placement] agreement may not be
signed by either the birth parents or the prospective adoptive parents until the time of discharge
of the birth mother from the hospital."); id. § 88oi.3(c)(2) ("[The adoption placement agreement
form shall include a] statement that the birth parent understands that.., if the birth parent takes
no further action, on the 31st day after signing the adoption placement agreement, the agreement
shall become a permanent and irrevocable consent to the adoption."); GA. CODE ANN. § i9-8- 9 (b)
(2004) ("A person signing a surrender [of parental rights] ... shall have the right to withdraw the
surrender by written notice delivered in person or mailed by registered mail or statutory overnight
delivery within ten days after signing...."); IOWA CODE ANN. § 6ooA.4(2)(g) (West Supp. 2005)
("[A release of custody s]hall be signed, not less than seventy-two hours after the birth of the child
to be released, by all living parents. The seventy-two-hour minimum time period requirement
shall not be waived."); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-6 (2003) ("Any duly licensed child placement
agency in this state, or governmental child placement agency, at the request of the natural parent
or parents of a child under eighteen (18) years of age, may, not sooner than fifteen (i5) days after
the birth of the child, petition the family court for the termination of the rights of the natural par-
ents of the child to consent to its adoption."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1sA, § 2-404(a) (2002) ("A parent
whose consent to the adoption of a minor is required by section 2-401 of this title may not execute
a consent or a relinquishment sooner than 36 hours after the minor is born. A parent who exe-
cutes a consent or relinquishment may revoke the consent or relinquishment within 2 1 days after
the consent or relinquishment is executed by filing a written notice in the court in which the con-
sent was executed.").
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through public adoption agencies, require adoptive parents in private
adoptions to pay for birth mothers' separate legal counsel, or otherwise
take steps to make certain that birth mothers are aware of their rights
within the adoption process and their rights if they decide not to place
a child for adoption.8 6 With such provisions, the law could recognize
and protect the dignity and distinctiveness of the parent-child relation
in ways that are also designed to protect birth mothers, rather than
simply focused on limiting the compensation that birth mothers may
receive.
C. Reforming the Legal Restrictions
on Economic Exchange Within Intimate Relationships
In sum, the law might usefully seek to reduce the distributive costs
of its efforts to mark the specialness of intimate relationships by pursu-
ing means of differentiation that do not involve restrictions on eco-
nomic exchange. Yet at the same time, it is highly doubtful that the
law will abandon the notion that limiting economic exchange within
intimate relationships is an important way to signify the specialness of
those relationships. In some cases, there are practical and compelling
reasons to want certain restrictions on economic exchange. For in-
stance, allowing the sale of children would be likely to endanger chil-
dren's welfare, to undermine the parent-child relationship, and to
lessen the value placed on human life. A child is not a commodity and
should not be subject to the same rules of economic exchange applied
to commodities. Moreover, even in cases where the reasons for re-
stricting economic exchange within intimate relationships may be less
practically compelling, the legal tradition of limiting economic ex-
change between intimates is deeply entrenched and unlikely to be for-
saken. Restraints on economic exchange have long wielded an enor-
mous legal and social power to differentiate intimate relationships,
even if intimate relations are not, and have never been, completely
separate from the market.
86 California does require adoptive parents to pay for a birth mother's separate legal counsel if
the birth mother so requests. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 88oi.5(c) (West 2004) ("The department
shall prescribe the format and process for advising birth parents of their rights, the content of
which shall include, but not be limited to, the following: . . . (4) The right to separate legal counsel
paid for by the prospective adoptive parents upon the request of the birth parent, as provided for
by Section 88oo."); id. § 88oo(d) ("Notwithstanding any other law, it is unethical for an attorney to
undertake the representation of both the prospective adoptive parents and the birth parents of a
child in any negotiations or proceedings in connection with an adoption unless a written consent
is obtained from both parties. The written consent shall include all of the following: (i) A notice
to the birth parents ... of their right to have an independent attorney advise and represent them
in the adoption proceeding and that the prospective adoptive parents may be required to pay the
reasonable attorney's fees up to a maximum of five hundred dollars ($500) for that representation,
unless a higher fee is agreed to by the parties.").
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In this light, it is worth exploring how the law might adjust its re-
strictions on economic exchange within intimate relationships in an at-
tempt to reduce the restrictions' undesirable distributive consequences.
The law has good reasons for wanting to mark the specialness of inti-
mate relationships. But the legal system can and should pursue its in-
terest in differentiating intimacy with more concern that the process
not leave some participants desperate and resourceless. Intimacy can
be sacred and distinctive without being impoverishing.
One reason that the law's present efforts to differentiate intimacy
may be impoverishing is that these efforts seem to systematically as-
sume, and then help perpetuate, dependency. For instance, we have
examined a number of contexts in which the law denies women rights
to compensation for their activities on the apparent presumption that
the women will receive support from someone else. In the process,
these refusals to compensate make women more reliant on others for
support. If one drops the assumption that women will always be sup-
ported by other people, the law's strategies for marking intimate rela-
tions might seem to impose extraordinarily high costs. In fact, many
women have no one else to support them. Moreover, depending on
another person may not be nearly as reliable or secure a source of in-
come as self-support in any event. This suggests that one way to make
intimacy less impoverishing may be to find means of reaffirming the
distinctiveness of intimate relationships that also recognize the signifi-
cance of self-support for both men and women.
Take the example of adoption again. As we have seen, birth moth-
ers placing a child for adoption are currently permitted to receive liv-
ing and medical expenses from the adoptive parents. A mass of stat-
utes and court opinions strictly define what constitutes a living or
medical expense.8 7 States, though, might consider allowing more re-
sources to flow to birth mothers in ways that would help birth mothers
improve their life chances and their ability to support themselves. For
instance, states might permit adoptive parents to pay for a birth
mother's educational expenses or job training, something that some
state adoption statutes now explicitly prohibit.8s
87 See sources cited supra note 5 I.
88 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 525/4.i(a) (West Supp. 2005) ("A person or persons who
have filed or intend to file a petition to adopt a child under the Adoption Act shall be permitted to
pay the reasonable living expenses of the biological parents of the child sought to be adopted ....
'Reasonable living expenses' ... does not include ... educational expenses, or other similar ex-
penses of the biological parents." (footnote omitted)); MINN. STAT. § 259.55(I) (2004) ("In any
adoption under this chapter, a prospective adoptive parent or anyone acting in concert with, at
the direction of, or on behalf of a prospective adoptive parent may pay only the following ex-
penses of the birth parent ... (4) reasonable living expenses of the birth mother ... (iii) reasonable
living expenses does not include ... educational expenses, or other similar expenses of the birth
mother."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-7-10I(I) (2003) ("Reasonable adoption fees may be paid by
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This legal reform could enhance a birth mother's opportunities in
life and capacity for self-support, without sanctioning unlimited pay-
ments between adoptive parents and birth mothers. It would use
structured and special forms of exchange to mark the specialness of
the parent-child relation. It would acknowledge the power of legal re-
strictions on economic transfer to affirm the importance and distinct-
iveness of parenthood and to express society's abhorrence of the prac-
tice of selling children. At the same time, the proposed reform would
permit more resources to go to birth mothers in ways that advance
constructive aims and self-support. The reform would make it less
likely that the law's efforts to differentiate and sanctify intimate rela-
tionships will leave those intimates with the fewest assets and the least
bargaining power desperate and impoverished. It would recognize
that the law need not be and should not be so focused on affirming the
specialness of intimate relationships that it abandons some participants
without resources.
CONCLUSION
There is no guarantee that the legal system will be willing to adjust
the ways it demarcates intimacy. Yet legal reform that pursues new or
simply modified means of denoting the specialness of intimate relation-
ships might help change intuitions, both within the legal system and
outside of it, about the best and most reasonable ways for the law to
differentiate intimate relations. There is good cause, moreover, to in-
vite flexibility in the legal system. As we have seen, the law's present
efforts to establish an intimate relationship's special dignity and worth
by declaring its separation from the market appear to systematically
burden people who are already disproportionately burdened. This
gives us good reason to reexamine the legal system's current attempts
to mark the distinctiveness of intimate relationships and to explore al-
ternative ways of differentiating intimate relations that might aid those
people who are now most likely to be injured by the law's efforts at
social sanctification.
the adoptive parent for the actual cost of services. The cost of services must relate to ... (k) other
reasonable costs related to adoption that do not include education ... for the birth parent."); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § I7o-B:I 3(I) (Supp. 2004) ("In any adoption of an unrelated minor child under
this chapter, an intended adoptive parent or anyone acting in concert with, at the direction of, or
on behalf of an intended adoptive parent shall pay only the following expenses of the birth par-
ent ... (d) Reasonable living expenses of the birth mother .... Reasonable living expenses shall
not include .. .educational expenses...."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-09(0) (2004) ("A petition
for adoption must ... state ... j. That the petitioner's expenses were reasonable as verified by the
court.... Reasonable fees may include... (5) Living expenses of the birth mother .... (b) Living
expenses do not include ... educational expenses . .. or other similar expenses of a birth
mother.").
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